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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, private capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa have increased considerably, 
becoming a major source of economic financing. Not only have private capital flow levels 
become important but also private capital flow volatility patterns. Many sub-Saharan African 
countries may not have the capacity to deal with pro-cyclical private capital flows (and 
subsequent reversals) which may impact on their macroeconomic performance. There is much 
controversy concerning the use of unrestricted financial openness policies as they could lead 
to crisis episodes and external shocks brought on by private capital flow volatility.  
The study conducts an investigation into the determinants and consequences of private capital 
flow volatility in sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, the study addresses the following four 
questions: (a) What are the determinants of private capital flow volatility? (b) Is there a 
relationship between remittance volatility and financial sector development? (c) Is there a 
relationship between cross-border banking volatility (loans and deposits) and economic 
growth? (d) Is there a relationship between financial openness and output volatility? 
The results of the study have been organized into four empirical essays. The first essay 
investigates the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity and cross-
border bank lending inflows. The panel data models are estimated using the Augmented Mean 
Group (AMG) estimator to account for cross-section dependence. The results show that: (1) 
Global liquidity lowers FDI volatility while for middle-income countries (MICs) global 
liquidity and global risk are significant drivers of FDI volatility; (2) Global risk increases 
portfolio equity volatility with the quality of macroeconomic policies and financial openness 
found to be important pull factors in lowering portfolio equity volatility; and (3) Financial 
openness and depth lowers cross-border bank lending volatility. For low-income countries 
(LICs), global liquidity lowers cross-border bank lending volatility while the quality of 
macroeconomic policies is an important pull factor in lowering volatility. Because global push 
factors are significant determinants of private capital flow volatility, sub-Saharan African 
countries should seek ways to strengthen their ability to deal with volatile episodes. Effective 
monitoring of capital flows, better trained and qualified staff, and greater sub-Saharan African 
country representation in international financial institutions to enable broader policy 
coordination is recommended. Positively, some of the results imply that prudent 
macroeconomic policies as pull factors can lower volatility. 
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The second essay investigates whether remittance volatility impacts on financial sector 
development. Using panel data estimation techniques, the empirical evidence from this essay 
reveals that remittance volatility is detrimental to both banking sector depth and efficiency. No 
evidence is found that remittance volatility is related to stock market development. Sub-
Saharan African countries should have measures in place to monitor the predictability of 
remittances. A policy question regarding the cost of remittance transfer is necessary. Sub-
Saharan Africa remains the most expensive region to send money to and lowering transaction 
costs should result in more remittances being channelled through formal channels, making 
flows more predictable and less volatile. More competition among money transfer operators 
could possibly reduce the cost of remittance transfer and should be investigated. 
The third essay investigates whether cross-border banking volatility impacts on economic 
growth. Using a panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique, this 
essay provides evidence that cross-border bank deposit volatility is detrimental to economic 
growth when the sample includes only resource-rich developing countries (RRDCs). The 
results further indicate that cross-border bank deposit flows contribute to economic growth in 
sub-Saharan Africa, but no evidence is found that cross-border bank lending is related to 
economic growth. RRDCs should have measures in place to monitor the predictability of bank 
deposit flows. Policy makers should further investigate ways to make banking less expensive 
for deposit customers as high minimum balance requirements and fees for account holders are 
prevalent in many African countries. The feasibility of investigating explicit deposit insurance 
within sub-Saharan Africa should be investigated as only a limited number of African countries 
have explicit deposit insurance. 
The fourth and last essay investigates whether financial openness is a source of output 
volatility. The essay investigates how financial openness impacts on output volatility through 
the channel of volatile FDI flows. The panel data models are estimated using the AMG 
estimator to account for cross-section dependence. The findings of this essay are as follows: 
(1) financial openness increases output volatility, (2) no evidence is found that FDI volatility 
is related to output volatility, (3) the extent to which financial openness increases output 
volatility does not depend on the degree of FDI volatility, and (4) for MICs, financial openness 
increases output volatility while for LICs increased trade openness and a higher level of 
economic development reduces output volatility. The results in this essay support the view that 
some countries may need to open up their capital markets using a more gradual approach. 
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In conclusion, the combined evidence reveals that sub-Saharan African countries should be 
concerned with not only private capital flow levels, but also the volatility of such flows. The 
significance of global push factors as determinants of private capital flow volatility is 
highlighted. While not disputing the relative stability of remittances relative to other private 
capital flow types, this study reveals that remittance volatility is not trivial and impacts on 
banking sector development. The results further indicate that cross-border bank loans and 
deposits require a differentiated analysis. This thesis concluded by indicating that financial 
openness remains a controversial policy option in sub-Saharan Africa and is a source of output 
volatility.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Private capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa are currently larger than official development 
assistance (ODA) and have increased considerably in recent years. For instance, inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) increased from less than US$15 billion in 2001 to approximately 
US$37 billion in 2011, while cross-border bank lending increased from US$60 billion in 2000 
to US$138 billion in 2012 (Hou, Keane, Kennan, Massa, & te Velde, 2013). 
Sub-Saharan African countries are different in the structure of their economies compared to the 
rest of the world. Public infrastructure investment, agriculture, and an increasingly buoyant 
services sector are key growth drivers in the region while large budgetary imbalances in several 
countries are a source of vulnerability to exogenous shocks (World Bank, 2014). Many sub-
Saharan African countries also rely on export markets for growth (Allen & Giovannetti, 2011). 
Berman and Martin (2012) showed that exporting countries from the region are more 
vulnerable than other groups of countries to banking crises in the countries to which they were 
exporting. Contagion from global factors are not the only concern. The Ebola outbreak has 
demonstrated that growth would slow not only in the core countries, but also in the region 
through disruptions in transportation, cross-border trade, and supply chains (World Bank, 
2014). Therefore, the potential spill over of economic factors and behaviours across countries 
in the region present a complex problem of heterogeneity and cross-section dependence which 
studies need to take into consideration. 
High levels of poverty, and low levels of income and domestic savings in the region necessitate 
external capital to spur investment and growth (Asiedu, 2002). As at June 2010, 33 out of 48 
sub-Saharan African countries were classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
(Adenutsi, Aziakpono, & Ocran, 2012). Private capital flows have been promoted by African 
policy makers and developmental partners as important investment vehicles to address Africa’s 
growth problem (Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi, & Yawson, 2014).  
In the late 1980s many sub-Saharan African countries opted for major policy reforms and 
market-friendly initiatives driven by Bretton Woods institutions and referred to as “structural 
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adjustment programs”. Financial and trade liberalization were major aspects of these reforms 
(Ahmed, 2013). Subsequently, many sub-Saharan African countries have implemented policies 
to liberalize their financial sectors, including easing or lifting interest rate ceilings, reducing 
interference in the credit market, privatizing state-owned commercial banks, and lowering 
entry barriers and compulsory reserve requirements (Misati & Nyamongo, 2012). In addition, 
a host of countries started to develop local stock markets while the entry of foreign financial 
intermediaries was encouraged. Financial-sector policies are central in the debate on how to 
spur growth and reduce poverty levels in low-income countries (Beck, Fuchs, & Uy, 2009).  
Increased capital flows allow countries with insufficient savings to tap into a global pool which 
can (i) enhance the efficiency of resource allocation, (ii) facilitate technology and management 
transfer, particularly through FDI, (iii) enable countries to fund welfare-enhancing current 
account imbalances (e.g. for productive investment or consumption smoothing), and (iv) enable 
portfolio diversification. Indirect benefits such as financial sector development, 
macroeconomic policy discipline, trade, and economic efficiency can also ensue (IMF, 2012b). 
There remains much controversy regarding the benefits of financial openness (Ferreiro, Correa, 
& Gomez, 2009; Aizenman, Jinjarak, & Park, 2013). Critics of financial liberalization contend 
that higher capital inflows are transitory and can lead to perverse consequences including an 
overvalued exchange rate, trade deficits, and increased consumption expenditures (Ferreiro et 
al., 2009). Financial openness can increase vulnerability to crises and external shocks brought 
on by volatile capital flows (IMF, 2012a; Hwang, Park, & Shin, 2013). Private capital flows 
were a key channel of crisis transmission for developing economies integrated into 
international capital markets during the global financial crisis (Essers, 2013).  
Capital flow volatility has increased in the past decade and could have numerous economic 
consequences (Forbes & Warnock, 2012). These include amplifying economic cycles, 
increasing financial system vulnerabilities, and worsening overall macroeconomic instability. 
Although the volume of capital flows to developing countries has increased substantially, their 
volatility has received very meagre attention in the literature (Demir, 2009).  
1.2 Research problem 
The first objective of this study is to investigate the determinants of private capital flow 
volatility in sub-Saharan Africa. A different line of inquiry concerning the effects of financial 
globalization pertains to the view that not all capital flow types are created equal (Kose, Prasad, 
Rogoff, & Wei, 2009). Because of the heterogeneous nature of capital flows, to lump them 
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together to examine their impact may not be sensible (Aizenman et al., 2013). The different 
private capital flow volatility determinants examined regarding this objective are FDI, portfolio 
equity, and cross-border banking lending. 
The empirical literature typically distinguishes between two types of determinants of capital 
flows: push- and pull factors (Sarno, Tsiakas, & Ulloa, 2016). While most of these 
contributions investigate the determinants of the level of capital flows, few studies focus on 
the determinants of volatility (Broto, Diaz-Cassou, & Erce, 2011). Studies that have examined 
the determinants of private capital flow volatility include those of Neumann, Penl, and Tanku 
(2009), Broto et al. (2011), Mercado and Park (2011), and Lee, Park, and Byun (2013). 
However, no study has focused exclusively on sub-Saharan Africa when investigating the 
determinants of private capital flow volatility. 
Additional objectives of this study are to investigate some of the economic consequences of 
private capital flow volatility and financial openness in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This study next explores the gap in the literature regarding the link between remittance 
volatility and financial development for sub-Saharan African countries at a macroeconomic 
level. This study distinguishes between the effect of remittance volatility on financial sector 
depth and financial sector efficiency. While other African studies within the remittances-
financial development nexus focused on financial depth (see Gupta, Patillo, & Wagh, 2009; 
Ajilore & Ikhide, 2012), this study is extended to include financial sector efficiency. This study 
further contributes to the literature by not only focusing on the financial development of banks 
but also investigating the impact of remittance volatility on stock markets. 
As opposed to other private capital flows, cross-border banking has only recently attracted 
attention in the empirical literature. An important and yet hardly explored area is the impact of 
cross-border banking volatility on economic growth. Sander, Kleimeier, and Heuchemer 
(2013) state that an emerging consensus in the literature proposes that cross-border banking 
analysis must focus on gross as opposed to net stocks and flows, therefore it is important to 
differentiate between assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits). This study explores the gap in the 
literature regarding the link between cross-border banking volatility (loans and deposits) and 
economic growth for sub-Saharan African countries at a macroeconomic level. 
A potential cost of financial openness is output volatility. The sparse literature on the effects 
of financial openness on output volatility warrants more empirical research (Kose et al., 2009). 
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Also, there is still no consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature on whether financial 
openness increases or reduces output volatility (Hwang et al., 2013; Meller, 2013). 
1.3 The gap in the literature 
Apart from no prior study that has focused exclusively on sub-Saharan Africa when 
investigating the determinants of private capital flow volatility, this study is further distinctive 
in that clearly-delineated cross-border bank lending data from the Bank for International 
Settlements’ (BIS) Locational Banking Statistics were employed that has not been used by 
prior studies. Prior empirical studies that analysed disaggregated flows (e.g. Neumann et al., 
2009; Broto et al., 2011; Mercado & Park, 2011) have used balance of payments data from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics that incorporated a residual category, “other 
investment,” including cross-border bank lending as a subcomponent. Other forms of cross-
border finance (e.g. trade finance and cash) are however also included in this category that 
fundamentally differs from bank loans (World Bank, 2014). 
While most of the empirical literature has found a positive relationship between remittances 
and financial development at a macroeconomic level, evidence remains mixed. Prior studies 
generally investigate only one characteristic of financial development (financial depth) for 
financial institutions. The impact of remittances on stock market development and financial 
sector efficiency has received little attention and is also included in this study. No prior 
empirical study has investigated the impact of remittance volatility on financial development 
at a macroeconomic level. For objective two, this study explores the gap in the literature 
regarding the link between remittance volatility and financial development (financial depth and 
financial efficiency) for banks and stock markets for sub-Saharan African countries at a 
macroeconomic level. 
Mixed evidence is found regarding the influence of cross-border bank lending on economic 
growth while little empirical studies have investigated the impact of cross-border bank lending 
volatility on economic growth. In addition, there is an absence of studies that have captured 
the influence of bank deposit flows on economic growth. For objective three, this study 
explores the gap in the literature regarding the link between cross-border banking volatility 
(loans and deposits) and economic growth for sub-Saharan African countries at a 
macroeconomic level. 
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While previous sub-Saharan African studies have examined the financial openness and output 
volatility link, this study is unique in that it specifically investigates how financial openness 
impacts on output volatility through the channel of volatile FDI flows.  
Capital flow volatility and output volatility could exhibit cross-section dependence through 
regional and macroeconomic linkages that arise from common global shocks (e.g. global 
financial crisis), shared institutions (e.g. the IMF), or from country or regional local spill overs. 
Standard panel estimation techniques do not necessarily produce consistent parameter 
estimates when the errors from a panel regression exhibit cross-section dependence 
(Kapetanios, Pesaran, & Yamagata, 2011). No prior empirical studies have accounted for this 
interdependence across countries in their methodology when investigating the determinants of 
capital flow volatility, or when examining the link between financial openness and output 
volatility. Previous studies that have investigated the determinants of capital flow volatility 
have primarily used estimators developed for micro datasets to analyse macro panel data. For 
objectives one and four, this study fills the gap in the econometric technique used in previous 
studies by estimating models using the Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator of Eberhardt 
and Teal (2010) to account for cross-section dependence and non-stationarity. 
1.4 Research questions 
 What are the determinants of private capital flow volatility in sub-Saharan Africa? 
 Is there a relationship between remittance volatility and financial sector development 
in sub-Saharan Africa? 
 Is there a relationship between cross-border banking volatility (loans and deposits) and 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa? 
 Is there a relationship between financial openness and output volatility in sub-Saharan 
Africa? 
1.5 Research objectives 
 Investigate the determinants of private capital flow volatility in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Determine if there is a relationship between remittance volatility and financial sector 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Determine if there is a relationship between cross-border banking volatility and 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 Determine if there is a relationship between financial openness and output volatility in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1.6 Research hypotheses 
The following research hypotheses are provided for research questions/objectives 2-4: 
 H0: Remittance volatility does not have a significant and negative impact on financial 
sector development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
HA: Remittance volatility has a significant and negative impact on financial sector 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 H0: Cross-border banking volatility does not have a significant and negative impact on 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. 
HA: Cross-border banking volatility has a significant and negative impact on economic 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 H0: Financial openness does not have a significant and negative impact on output 
volatility in sub-Saharan Africa. 
HA: Financial openness has a significant and negative impact on output volatility in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
1.7 Significance of the study 
Managing the volatility of private capital flows to developing countries has become a challenge 
for flows are more volatile than those in developed countries (Broner & Rigobon, 2004; Broto 
et al., 2011). Given that private capital flows to developing countries can be a major source of 
economic financing, policies that aim to encourage stable flows are particularly relevant (Broto 
et al., 2011). Many sub-Saharan African fragile economies are characterised by a low resilience 
and capacity to cope with shocks (Allen & Giovannetti, 2011) and, therefore, it becomes 
important to examine the determinants of private capital flow volatility in the region. 
A better understanding of the consequences of remittance-receiving patterns – not only 
remittance levels – on the receiving economies will become more important in future years 
considering that the percentage of individuals living in countries other than those of their birth 
are rising (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2012). For policies to leverage the most out of 
remittance inflows to developing countries it is essential that the predictability of remittances 
be given full attention (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2014). With remittance levels 
complementing financial sector development in sub-Saharan Africa (Gupta et al., 2009), it also 
becomes necessary to investigate whether remittance volatility has an impact on financial 
sector development in the region. 
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With the presence of foreign banks having increased considerably in recent decades, it becomes 
necessary to examine whether there is a link between cross-border banking volatility and 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. This is important as the negative effects of cross-
border banking volatility could explain the region’s poor economic performance relative to 
increased cross-border banking flows. 
Financial liberalization policies have not had the desired impact on sub-Saharan African 
economies (Fowowe, 2013) and output volatility appears endemic in much of the region (Malik 
& Temple, 2009). For macroeconomic policies to successfully stabilize growth volatility it is 
essential to discern whether financial openness is a source of such volatility. 
1.8 Chapter organization 
The thesis is organized around four main themes similar to the research questions and 
objectives. Each theme has been developed into a stand-alone essay. In terms of chapters, the 
thesis consists of seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the research by highlighting the 
research problem and the significance of the study. 
The second chapter reviews the trends of private capital flows and private capital flow volatility 
in sub-Saharan Africa, providing a contextual stage for the empirical chapters to follow. The 
third chapter begins the empirical investigation by examining the determinants of private 
capital flow volatility. The fourth chapter assesses whether remittance volatility impacts on 
financial sector development. The fifth chapter explores the link between cross-border banking 
volatility and economic growth. The empirical analysis ends with Chapter Six which 
investigates whether financial openness leads to output volatility in the region. The thesis ends 
with Chapter Seven that concludes and provides policy recommendations and future research 
possibilities. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS AND PRIVATE CAPITAL 
FLOW VOLATILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the trends of private capital flows and private capital flow volatility in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The different private capital flow types examined are FDI, portfolio equity, 
remittances, and cross-border banking (loans and deposits). The chapter sets a contextual stage 
for the empirical chapters to follow. 
Private capital flow trends in sub-Saharan Africa are different to other emerging and 
developing economies. For instance, portfolio flows remain small compared with flows to other 
emerging and developing economies (IMF, 2014) while the region is also the least recipient of 
remittances in terms of actual volume and per capita (Adenutsi, 2014). Capital flow volatility 
could overwhelm the relative shallow financial markets of sub-Saharan Africa (IMF, 2014) and 
countries within the region may require a different framework to manage vulnerabilities 
compared to other emerging and developing economies. The possible effect of capital flow 
volatility may be amplified because of the structure of sub-Saharan African economies. Very 
few sub-Saharan African countries have a positive net international investment position and 
countries that run a government deficit for years could potentially reach an unsustainable level 
(Hou, Keane, Kennan, Massa, & te Velde, 2013). When aid is not remaining at a high level, 
the productivity of capital inflows would need to be enhanced (Hou et al., 2013), thus further 
requiring countries to manage the vulnerabilities associated with capital flow volatility. 
2.2 Private capital flow volatility 
Measuring capital flow volatility is not simple and some studies have used the standard 
deviation of flows over a rolling window of annual data while others used the estimated 
volatilities of a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) (1,1) 
model (Broto, Diaz-Cassou, & Erce, 2011). Because of using low frequency (annual) data, 
using a GARCH (1,1) model is not considered suitable. To compute volatility, this study uses 
the measure most frequently employed in the literature: the standard deviation of capital flows 
in a rolling window, also employed by Neumann, Penl, and Tanku (2009), Mercado and Park 
(2011), and Lee, Park, and Byun (2013). 
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As in Broto et al. (2011) and Lee et al. (2013) the standard deviation of capital flows in a rolling 
window, σit, is expressed as follows: 
 
𝜎𝑖𝑡 = (
1
𝑛
∑ (flow𝑖𝑘 −  μ
𝑡
𝑘=𝑡−(𝑛−1)
)²)
1
2
 (2.1) 
where μ = 1
𝑛
∑ .𝑡𝑘=𝑡−(𝑛−1) flowik, and flowik represents private capital flows relative to GDP 
respectively for country i in period k. 
An increase in private capital flows would inflate the volatility size over time because the 
standard deviation indicates dispersion from the mean. Therefore, following Lee et al. (2013), 
this study first normalizes the capital flow size in a rolling window to account for sudden and 
inflated private capital flows since the 1990s. This is done by setting the largest flow in the 
window in absolute terms at 100 and adjusting the rest of the flows in the window accordingly. 
Three-year overlapping rolling windows are used as opposed to five-year rolling windows to 
minimize data loss in the portfolio equity series. In addition, data for cross-border banking is 
only available from 1996.  
Although recent empirical research on capital flows has started focusing on disaggregated gross 
flows (e.g. Forbes & Warnock, 2012; Broner, Didier, Erce, & Schmukler, 2013) this study 
focuses on net flows while acknowledging that this focus reflects the joint behaviour of foreign 
and domestic agents. These different agents could have different motivations and incentives. 
This focus is largely driven by the availability of sub-Saharan Africa data. Figure 2.1 
graphically depicts the calculated volatilities. 
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Figure 2.1 graphically depicts the calculated volatilities.
 
Figure 2.1: Volatilities of private capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2011 
Source: Author’s calculations using World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) 
(2016) online database and Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) Locational Banking 
Statistics (2014) 
Note:  FDI volatility (FDIVOL); Portfolio equity volatility (PEVOL); Remittance volatility 
(REMVOL); Cross-border bank lending volatility (LVOL); and Cross-border bank 
deposit volatility (DVOL).  
            The scale of the vertical axis is the calculated volatilities computed as the standard 
deviation of capital flows in three-year overlapping rolling windows with capital flow 
sizes first normalized. 
 
Portfolio equity has the highest average volatility at 51.6 followed by FDI volatility (37.7), 
cross-border bank lending volatility (22.2), remittance volatility (19.0), and cross-border bank 
deposit volatility (13.4). FDI is usually considered the most stable of private capital flows 
(Adams, 2009). Contrary to popular acceptance, FDI volatility has been higher on average than 
average cross-border banking (loans and deposits) volatility. 
2.3 FDI 
FDI is sought by many sub-Saharan African countries because of the large, positive 
externalities which are associated with these flows (Adjasi, Abor, Osei, & Nyavor-Foli, 2012). 
The related literature has revealed several benefits of FDI, including technology spill overs, 
global trade integration, better management techniques, forward and backward linkages, and 
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the enhancement of a more competitive business environment (Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi, & 
Yawson, 2013).  
Institutional quality in the form of political stability has been found to be a significant FDI 
determinant in Africa (Naudé & Krugell, 2007). However, FDI is also sensitive to global 
factors. While confirming that FDI inflows are negatively associated with political risk, Méon 
and Sekkat (2012) also found that FDI flows are less sensitive to political risk when the global 
volume of FDI is larger. An implication of this finding is that global risk-taking increases when 
global FDI activity increases. Therefore, not only FDI volumes but also FDI volatility would 
be affected by institutional quality (Méon & Sekkat, 2012). Allen and Giovannetti (2011) 
reported that in the second half of 2008 and the first half of 2009, a number of investment 
projects in sub-Saharan Africa were put on hold or cancelled. For example, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Zambia had mining projects cancelled while Sudan had a refinery 
postponed (Allen & Giovannetti, 2011). 
FDI inflows to the region have surged tremendously since the 1990s. FDI to sub-Saharan Africa 
was estimated at US$1.2 billion in 1990 while over US$40 billion was estimated in 2011 
(World Bank, 2016). Despite more countries being open to FDI, the levels on the African 
continent remain low compared to global trends (Agbloyor et al., 2013). Africa only attracted 
5.5% of global FDI projects in 2011, up from 4.5% in 2010 (Ernst & Young, 2012). In 2011, 
Africa as a whole attracted fewer FDI projects than India and only about half as much as China. 
Africa has attracted 4.3% of global FDI projects since 2003 compared to 6% and 10.5% for 
India and China respectively. Nevertheless, an upward trend is apparent. Particularly from 
2007, even allowing for the global financial crisis, compound growth of approximately 20% in 
the number of new FDI projects has been recorded. The reliance and growth attractiveness of 
the continent as an investment destination is thus clearly reflected (Ernst & Young, 2012). 
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Figure 2.2: African countries’ share of new African FDI projects from 2003-2011 
Source: Ernst & Young (2012) 
Figure 2.2 indicates the top 15 African countries that attracted 82% of new African FDI projects 
from 2003-2011. The 16% of new African FDI projects from 2003-2011 to South Africa shown 
in Figure 2.2 numbered 827 projects. It can be seen that after South Africa, the next sub-
Saharan African countries are Nigeria and Angola with 5.9% and 5.5% of new African FDI 
projects respectively. 
The sub-Saharan African countries with the highest calculated volatilities are the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (58.9), Angola (51.3), Gabon (50.3), Liberia (49.3), Burundi (49.2), and 
Cameroon (49.1). Noticeably, of the six highest FDI volatility countries, only Burundi is not 
classified as a resource-rich developing country (RRDC) following IMF (2012) criteria. Figure 
2.3 graphically depicts the calculated FDI volatilities of RRDCs compared with a sub-Saharan 
African comparison group. 
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Figure 2.3: FDI volatility to RRDCs, 1990-2011 
Source: Author’s calculations using World Bank WDI (2016) online database 
Note:  FDI volatility (FDIVOL); Resource-rich developing country (RRDC); Comparison 
group (NRRDC).  
            The scale of the vertical axis is the calculated volatilities computed as the standard 
deviation of capital flows in three-year overlapping rolling windows with capital flow 
sizes first normalized. 
 
From Figure 2.3 it can be seen that FDI volatility has on average been higher in RRDCs (41.0) 
than in the comparison group of countries (36.3). In 2007 and 2008, coinciding with the global 
financial crisis, FDI volatility increased in RRDCs while decreasing in the comparison group 
countries.  
Figure 2.4 graphically depicts the calculated FDI volatilities of middle-income countries 
(MICs) and low-income countries (LICs) according to World Bank country income group 
classifications. 
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Figure 2.4: FDI volatility according to country income classification, 1990-2011 
Source: Author’s calculations using World Bank WDI (2016) online database 
Note:  FDI volatility (FDIVOL); middle-income countries (MIC); low-income countries 
(LIC).  
            The scale of the vertical axis is the calculated volatilities computed as the standard 
deviation of capital flows in three-year overlapping rolling windows with capital flow 
sizes first normalized. 
 
Figure 2.4 shows that FDI volatility has on average been higher in LICs (39.6) than in MICs 
(35.7). FDI volatility in RRDCs and in LICs is therefore higher than the average FDI volatility 
(37.3) calculated for 45 sub-Saharan African countries. 
2.4 Portfolio equity 
Equity markets are becoming more important as a source of investment funds for developing 
countries (Hearn, Piesse, & Strange, 2010). Apart from supplying funds for investment, equity 
flows could impact on development by broadening the choice of financial instruments available 
to savers allowing for risk diversification and facilitating resource mobilisation. In addition, a 
monitoring role for the corporate sector is also provided by equity investment flows (Moss, 
Ramachandran, & Standley, 2007). Interest in African equity markets has been rising due to 
their fast growth and their relative low correlation with markets of the developed world 
(Alagidede, 2011). 
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Portfolio equity flows are generally considered one of the most volatile private capital flow 
types (Ferreira & Laux, 2009), as also confirmed in Figure 2.1 for sub-Saharan Africa. A surge 
in portfolio equity flows could lead to a real estate boom and inflation while a sudden stop can 
stunt growth, increase interest rates, and lead to currency depreciation (Sarno, Tsiakas, & 
Ulloa, 2016). 
Table 2.1 presents stock market capitalization/GDP and average portfolio equity volatility for 
selected sub-Saharan African countries. 
Table 2.1: Portfolio equity volatility to sub-Saharan African countries 
Country Stock exchange Stock market 
capitalization to 
GDP (%), 2011 
Average 
portfolio equity 
volatility 
Botswana Botswana Stock Exchange 25.3 68.3 
Côte d’Ivoire Bourse Régionale des Valeurs 
Mobilières 
28.9 37.9 
Kenya Nairobi Stock Exchange 35.3 49.3 
Malawi Malawi Stock Exchange 22.9 46.5 
Mauritius Stock Exchange of Mauritius 69.8 45.8 
Namibia Namibia Stock Exchange 9.6 25.8 
Nigeria Nigerian Stock Exchange 17.3 58.1 
South Africa Johannesburg Stock Exchange 145.2 56.7 
Tanzania Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange 5.6 7.4 
Uganda Uganda Securities Exchange 26.2 80.9 
Zambia Lusaka Stock Exchange 17.7 54.8 
 
Source: World Bank WDI (2016) online database and author’s calculations  
Note:  Average portfolio equity volatility is calculated over different periods up to 2011 
depending from when data is available. 
 
Stock market depth, as measured by stock market capitalization to GDP, varies greatly in sub-
Saharan Africa. For 2011, South Africa has the highest stock market capitalization to GDP at 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
145.2%, followed by Mauritius at 69.8%. Stock market capitalization to GDP has decreased in 
South Africa since 2007 from 265.6% while the ratio has increased in Mauritius from 59.2%.  
Portfolio equity flows to sub-Saharan Africa have surged in recent decades. Inflows to the 
region were estimated at US$393 million in 1990 with approximately US$5 billion estimated 
in 2011 (World Bank, 2016). However, the volatile nature of these flows (and reversal of flows) 
is demonstrated in that approximately US$17 billion portfolio equity inflows to sub-Saharan 
Africa were recorded in 2006 (World Bank, 2016). The reversal in portfolio equity inflows was 
consistent with the fall of stock markets during the global financial crisis. During 2008, the 
following selected country stock index declines occurred: Nigeria All Share Index (46%), 
Mauritius All Share Indices (36%), Nairobi Stock Exchange 20-Share Index (34%), and the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Share Index (26%) (Hou et al., 2013). 
The average volatility of portfolio equity flows to Nigeria and South Africa has been higher 
than the average volatility portfolio equity flows in the region. 
2.5 Remittances 
The drastic increase in remittances to developing countries during the last decades has led 
researchers to investigate the developmental impact of remittances in several dimensions 
(Coulibaly, 2015). Many studies have investigated the impact of remittances on poverty, 
inequality, growth, education, infant mortality, and entrepreneurship (Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Cordova, Martinez Peria, & Woodruff, 2011). Recently, attention has also focused on whether 
remittances promote financial development in remittance-recipient countries (see Aggarwal, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Martinez Peria, 2011; Brown, Carmignani, & Fayad, 2013).  
Although altruism is cited as the primary motive for migrants to remit, repayment of loans as 
well as savings and investment considerations have also been demonstrated as important 
reasons in the literature (Chowdhury, 2011). The growing importance of remittances and their 
positive impact on recipient countries’ economic conditions have created strong incentives for 
governments to facilitate and attract these flows (Beine, Lodigiani, & Vermeulen, 2012). 
In the literature, remittances are often seen as a more stable source of external finance compared 
to other capital flows (Jackman, 2013). Migrants often transfer more money home when their 
families encounter economic hardship while adverse times also frequently trigger more 
migration resulting in greater remittance inflows (Singer, 2010). However, as the events of the 
global financial crisis unfolded, the countercyclical nature of remittance flows has been 
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questioned (Allen & Giovannetti, 2011). Adenutsi, Aziakpono, and Ocran (2012) found that 
remittances in sub-Saharan Africa are pro-cyclical and correlate positively with 
macroeconomic performance, while Nyamongo, Misati, Kipyegon, and Ndirangu (2012) found 
that remittance volatility has a negative effect on growth in Africa. Figure 2.5 depicts the time 
profile of remittances to 45 sub-Saharan African countries from 1990-2011. 
 
Figure 2.5: Remittances to sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2011 
Source: World Bank WDI (2016) 
From figure 2.5 it can be seen that remittances to sub-Saharan Africa have increased from 
approximately US$1.8 billion in 1990 to approximately US$30 billion in 2011. Remittances 
are becoming a significant source of external capital for countries in the region. For a typical 
sub-Saharan African country, remittances have increased from 1.6% of GDP in 2006 (Gupta, 
Pattillo, & Wagh, 2009) to 4% of GDP in 2012 (Aga & Martinez Peria, 2014). In 2011, there 
were 8 sub-Saharan African countries where remittances as a share of GDP exceeded 5% 
(World Bank, 2016). Remittances as a percentage of GDP exceeded 20% in Lesotho and 
Liberia. In the largest recipient countries, i.e. Nigeria and Senegal, remittances to GDP were 
5% and 11% respectively. Nigeria is by far the leading remittance recipient country in sub-
Saharan Africa, with US$20.6 billion recorded in 2011 representing almost 70% of all 
remittances to the region (World Bank, 2016). 
From 1991-2011, average remittance volatility to the region has been the highest in Sierra 
Leone (34.8), Seychelles (34.3), and Guinea (34.2). The average remittance volatility in 
Nigeria (24.9) has been higher than the average volatility in the region (19.0). 
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2.6 Cross-border banking 
Although interrupted by the global financial crisis, the past decades have witnessed an 
unprecedented increase in the globalization of financial services. Not only have cross-border 
bank flows increased considerably, but many banks (from developed and developing countries) 
have ventured abroad (Claessens & van Horen, 2014). Foreign banks can achieve better 
economies of scale and risk diversification than local banks (Detragiache, Tressel, & Gupta, 
2008). In addition, foreign banks introduce more advanced technology, import better 
supervision and regulation, and increase competition. Foreign affiliates of international banks 
may be perceived as safer than local banks, especially in times of economic hardship. Foreign 
banks may also be less susceptible to lend to connected parties (Detragiache et al., 2008). 
Together with portfolio equity flows, cross-border banking flows are also considered highly 
volatile (Herrmann & Mihaljek, 2013). However, as indicated in Figure 2.1, FDI volatility has 
on average been higher than cross-border banking volatility for sub-Saharan African countries. 
On average, cross-border lending volatility has been higher than cross-border bank deposit 
volatility, also shown in Figure 2.1. A plausible explanation for the difference could be that 
deposits are largely customer-driven and banks have little incentive to reject deposits, whereas 
information asymmetries may impact on the supply of cross-border bank loans (Kleimeier, 
Sander, & Heuchemer, 2013). 
The presence of foreign banks in Africa has increased considerably in recent decades. From 
1995 to 2009, cross-border bank branches or subsidiaries in Africa have increased from 120 to 
227, resulting in the share of foreign banks rising from 29% to 51% (Beck, Fuchs, Singer, & 
Witte, 2014). However, there are differences across the continent regarding foreign bank 
ownership (Beck et al., 2014). Foreign banks almost completely dominate some smaller 
country banking sectors including Benin, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
and Zambia. In a number of countries foreign banks control between 60%–80% of total banking 
sector assets, including Botswana, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, 
Namibia, Niger, and Senegal. Some countries with more developed banking sectors, i.e. Kenya, 
Nigeria, and South Africa, have a comparatively low share of foreign ownership in their 
banking systems, between 20%–35%. Foreign bank ownership in Africa can be grouped into 
two categories based on their geographical origin (Beck et al., 2014; UNCTAD, 2015): 
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 International banks from outside Africa, particularly Europe. However, there is an 
increasing presence of South-South banks from emerging economies such as India and 
China; and 
 African cross-border banks incorporated predominantly in Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, 
and South Africa. 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide a list of major International and African cross-border banks 
respectively. 
Table 2.2: Major international cross-border banks in Africa  
Name Location of 
headquarters 
Majority 
ownership 
Number of 
African 
countries 
Sociéte Générale France France 17 
Citigroup USA USA 15 
Standard Chartered UK UK 14 
BNP Paribas France France 13 
Bank of Baroda India India 9 
Access Holding Germany Unknown 5 
Albaraka Bank (Group) Bahrain Bahrain 5 
HBL Pakistan (Habib Bank Ltd.) Pakistan Tanzania 5 
International Commercial Bank 
(ICB) 
Switzerland Malaysia 5 
Rabobank Netherlands Netherlands 5 
 
Source: Beck et al. (2014) 
Note:  Number of countries includes home country (if African) as well as representations 
through branches and subsidiaries in African countries. Representative offices are 
excluded. 
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Table 2.3: Major African cross-border banks 
Name Location of 
headquarters 
Majority 
ownership 
Number of 
African 
countries 
Ecobank Togo South Africa 32 
UBA Nigeria Nigeria 19 
Stanbic South Africa South Africa 18 
BMCE Morocco Morocco 18 
BSIC Libya Libya 14 
Attijariwafa Bank Morocco Morocco 12 
BCP Morocco Morocco 11 
Barclays Africa Group South Africa UK 10 
Access Bank Nigeria Nigeria 9 
Guaranty Trust Bank Ltd. Nigeria Nigeria 9 
 
Source: Beck et al. (2014) 
Note:  Number of countries includes home country (if African) as well as representations 
through branches and subsidiaries in African countries. Representative offices are 
excluded. 
 
Cross-border bank lending in sub-Saharan Africa has increased from US$45.2 billion in 1995 
to US$92.7 billion in 2011, while cross-border bank deposits have increased from US$43.3 
billion in 1995 to a high of US$156.7 billion in 2007 (BIS, 2014). During the global financial 
crisis, cross-border bank deposits decreased to US$135.6 billion and US$126.4 billion 
respectively in 2008 and 2009 before increasing to US$150.5 billion in 2011 (BIS, 2014). In 
2012, the highest cross-border bank lending flows were recorded in South Africa (US$26.83 
billion) and Liberia (US$26.08 billion), while the highest cross-border bank deposit flows were 
recorded in South Africa (US$30.41 billion), Nigeria (US$26.63 billion), and Angola 
(US$26.15 billion). 
From 1996-2011, average cross-border bank lending volatility to the region has been highest 
in Comoros (38.9), Burundi (38.7), and Rwanda (38.7). Average cross-border bank deposit 
volatility was highest in Lesotho (35.3), and Swaziland (31.8). 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a contextual stage for the empirical chapters to follow. The measure used 
to compute volatility was discussed and presented. This chapter has highlighted some stylized 
facts and current trends regarding private capital flows and private capital flow volatility in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The different private capital flow types and their volatility examined were 
FDI, portfolio equity, remittances, and cross-border banking flows (loans and deposits). The 
chapter showed that all private capital flow types have increased considerably since the 1990s. 
The role of private capital flows and how best to attract and utilise them remain crucial for sub-
Saharan Africa and the chapter discussed the importance of the different capital flow types for 
economic development. It was found that portfolio equity has the highest average volatility 
over the period covered, while cross-border bank deposit flows are the most stable. The 
empirical chapters to follow will investigate the determinants and economic consequences of 
private capital flow volatility in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOW VOLATILITY IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Concerns have risen regarding the stability of capital flows to developing economies. It has 
been argued that global capital flows could have a destabilizing role in developing economies 
in particular when a financial crisis causes a sudden reversal of such flows (Neumann, Penl, & 
Tanku, 2009). The last decade witnessed an increase in capital flow volatility that could have 
numerous economic consequences (Forbes & Warnock, 2012). These consequences could 
include economic cycles being amplified by large capital flow increases and decreases, 
increased financial system vulnerabilities, and exacerbated macroeconomic instability. Capital 
inflow surges could overwhelm domestic financial markets and hamper the ability of 
macroeconomic policies’ ability to adjust through exchange rate appreciation, asset price 
bubbles, money market distortions, and credit booms and create unsustainable risk premium 
drops (IMF, 2012). 
Most empirical studies on capital flows focus on the determinants of capital flow levels with 
few studies on volatility, which is surprising given the link between the stability of capital 
flows and economic growth (Broto, Diaz-Cassou, & Erce, 2011). Demir (2009) states that 
although the volume of capital flows to developing countries increased substantially from the 
1990s, their volatility has received very meagre attention in the literature. No study has focused 
exclusively on sub-Saharan Africa when investigating the determinants of private capital flow 
volatility. The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of global and domestic factors on 
the determinants of the volatility of foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity and cross-
border bank lending inflows for sub-Saharan African countries. 
A novel feature of this study is the use of clearly-delineated cross-border bank lending data 
from the Bank for International Settlements’ (BIS) Locational Banking Statistics. Prior 
empirical studies that analysed disaggregated flows (e.g. Neumann et al., 2009; Broto et al., 
2011; Mercado & Park, 2011) have used balance of payments data from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics that incorporated a residual category, “other investment,” including cross-
border bank lending as a subcomponent. Other forms of cross-border finance (e.g. trade finance 
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and cash) are however also included in this category that fundamentally differs from bank loans 
(World Bank, 2014). 
Recent advances in the panel data literature allows the estimation of models subject to cross-
section dependence previously ignored by similar panel data studies in the related literature. 
Capital flow volatility could exhibit cross-section dependence through regional and 
macroeconomic linkages that arise from common global shocks (e.g. global financial crisis), 
shared institutions (e.g. the IMF), or from country or regional local spill overs. Standard panel 
estimation techniques do not necessarily produce consistent parameter estimates when the 
errors from a panel regression exhibit cross-section dependence (Kapetanios, Pesaran, & 
Yamagata, 2011). The models in this study are estimated using the Augmented Mean Group 
(AMG) estimator of Eberhardt and Teal (2010) to account for cross-section dependence. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides an overview of the 
relevant literature, Section 3.3 details the methodology employed in the empirical analysis, in 
Section 3.4 the results from the empirical estimations are presented and in Section 3.5 the 
chapter is concluded. 
3.2 Overview of the relevant literature 
Bekaert and Harvey (2003) stated that prior to financial liberalization, emerging market 
economies start with negligible capital flows while encountering considerable flows post-
liberalization that are subject to portfolio rebalancing. It should therefore not be surprising that 
capital flow volatility increases close to liberalization, but once large capital flows occur should 
subside. 
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004) introduced a framework to analyse how financial 
factors could lead to instability in small open economies. In an economy with a closed capital 
market, the response to a cash flow shock is limited given the constrained amount of capital 
available to finance entrepreneurs. The extra funding sources in an open economy could 
potentially increase the response to a shock and the potential for volatility. Aghion et al. (2004) 
concluded that unrestricted financial liberalization could be destabilizing without a sufficiently 
well-developed financial sector. 
A major subject in volatility of capital flows is the distinction between push and pull factors 
(Forbes & Warnock, 2012). Push factors reflect global economic forces that drive capital flows 
from developed to developing countries and could relate to global interest rates, global growth, 
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and global risk aversion and portfolio diversification (Sarno, Tsiakas, & Ulloa, 2016). Pull 
factors reflect domestic economic forces that attract capital into a country and capture the 
appeal of different locations for investment purposes and could relate to domestic interest rates, 
local growth potential and trade openness (Sarno et al., 2016). Tille and van Wincoop (2014) 
demonstrate how private information leads to increased capital flow volatility using a two-
country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model through unobserved push and 
pull factors. Several channels exist through which the unobserved factors impact capital flows. 
In the portfolio growth channel that is dependent on savings, unobserved pull factors impact 
capital flows through the relative asset price. An increase in these factors raise the relative 
home asset price, thereby lowering home saving and raising foreign saving, and through 
portfolio growth higher capital inflows occur. 
Through the average expected excess return channel, unobserved pull factors impact capital 
flows through the relative asset price. An increase in these factors raises the relative asset price 
that lowers relative home saving and increases relative home investment, with both causing an 
excess home asset supply. The expected excess home asset return will then rise to clear asset 
markets by a portfolio shift to home assets with capital inflows rising (Tille & van Wincoop, 
2014). In their model, a trade-off exists between home bias because of the cost of investing 
abroad and seeking risk reduction through diversification. Through the time-varying risk 
channel, an increase in the variance of the excess return will raise the portfolio diversification 
scope and increase capital inflows. The variance of the excess return only depends on push 
factors in all versions of the model (Tille & van Wincoop, 2014). 
In the empirical literature, Broner and Rigobon (2004) showed that capital flows to developing 
economies were much more volatile than those to developed economies and that 
macroeconomic controls offered little explanatory power to explain this. However, country 
characteristics such as quality of institutions, a high per capita income, and financial 
development were associated with lower volatility. 
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2007) suggest that the quality of institutions, as well 
as macroeconomic policy, were important determinants of capital flow volatility. IMF (2007) 
also found that institutional quality reduced capital inflow volatility. Other findings indicated 
that financial openness lowers capital flow volatility and that the volatility of capital inflows 
was partly driven by external factors such as global liquidity and hence outside the control of 
emerging economies. Alfaro et al. (2007) examined the volatility of portfolio equity flows 
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while IMF (2007) analysed the volatility of total inflows. Contrasting data on six industrial and 
six developing countries, the findings of Becker and Noon (2009) suggest that more developed 
markets could encourage greater substitutability between different types of capital flows that 
could help reduce overall capital account volatility. 
Using panel data from 1981-2000, Neumann et al. (2009) investigated the volatility of FDI 
inflows, portfolio inflows and other debt inflows following financial liberalization for a set of 
22 developing and developed economies. Their findings showed that different capital flow 
types responded differently to financial liberalization, with FDI inflows showing significant 
increases in volatility for emerging markets. Broto et al. (2011) examined the determinants of 
volatility of FDI inflows, portfolio inflows and other debt inflows to emerging economies with 
their findings highlighting the difficulties host governments faced in stabilizing capital flows. 
Specifically, since 2000 global factors not within the control of developing economies became 
increasingly significant. Mercado and Park (2011) used a panel GMM estimator on data from 
1980-2009 to examine the determinants of volatility of FDI inflows, portfolio inflows and other 
debt inflows to developing Asia. Their results suggested that institutional quality and pull 
factors such as trade openness, financial openness, and change in stock market capitalization 
were significant factors impacting on capital inflow volatility. 
The results from Pappas (2011) for Greece during the period 1983-2009 revealed that capital 
flows and speculative attacks were strongly determined by external economic factors. Forbes 
and Warnock (2012) used quarterly gross flows data in a sample of 58 countries from 1985-
2009 and found that global factors were significantly associated with extreme capital flow 
episodes with domestic macroeconomic characteristics generally less important. Similarly, the 
results from Globan (2015) suggested the rising influence of push factors were connected with 
higher capital inflow volatility in the European Union new member states.  
Using a GMM estimator for 49 emerging and developing economies from 1990-2009, Lee, 
Park, and Byun (2013) found significant contagion effects from intra-regional volatilities in 
different private capital flow types to emerging economies. Their findings further suggested 
that the volatility dynamics differ between gross and net flows. Broner, Didier, Erce, and 
Schmukler (2013) used a sample of 103 countries from 1970-2009 and demonstrated with panel 
estimation techniques the increasing size and volatility of gross capital flows. In comparison, 
the size and volatility of net flows remained stable. 
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To summarize, within the empirical literature no study has focused exclusively on sub-Saharan 
Africa when investigating the determinants of private capital flow volatility. Most of the studies 
that have focused on disaggregated capital inflows have used balance of payments data 
obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics to analyse FDI, portfolio and other 
flows. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Data on capital flows 
Recent empirical research on capital flows has started examining the behaviour of gross capital 
flows (e.g. Forbes & Warnock, 2012; Broner et al., 2013) that distinguishes between the 
behaviour of foreign and domestic agents that could have different motivations and incentives. 
The earlier focus in the literature on net flows is reasonable as during the 1990s net capital 
inflows almost mirrored gross inflows, implying that the capital outflows of domestic investors 
could be ignored with net inflows then interpreted as changes from foreign flows (Forbes & 
Warnock, 2012). For sub-Saharan Africa data on gross flows is still limited and, similar to 
Neumann et al. (2009) and Broto et al. (2011), this study’s focus is on capital inflows and the 
reversal of such flows and interpreted as the net inflows from foreign investors. 
3.3.2 Model specification 
Following the models adapted from Broto et al. (2011) and Mercado and Park (2011) the 
empirical model is specified as: 
 VOLit  =  β0 +  β1GLLIQt  +  β2VIXt  +  β3logGDPit  +  β4EXCHit  
+  β5TOit +  β6FOit  +  β8PVTCit  +  εit 
(3.1) 
 
This model is estimated three times for the three different private capital flows, i.e. FDI, 
portfolio equity, and cross-border bank lending, with the variables defined as follows: 
VOLit= Volatility of private capital flows measured as the standard deviation of capital inflows 
in three-year overlapping rolling windows of FDI inflows/GDP or Portfolio equity 
inflows/GDP or Cross-border bank lending/GDP of country i at year t. 
GLLIQt = Global liquidity at year t. 
VIXt= VIX index as a proxy for global risk at year t. 
logGDPit= GDP (constant 2005 US$) of country i at year t. 
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EXCHit= Official exchange rate of country i at year t. 
TOit= Trade openness of country i at year t. 
FOit= Financial openness of country i at year t. 
PVTCit = Private credit by deposit money bank other financial institutions/GDP of country i at 
year t. 
Measuring capital flow volatility is not simple and some studies have used the standard 
deviation of flows over a rolling window of annual data with others using the estimated 
volatilities of a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) (1,1) 
model (Broto et al., 2011). To compute volatility, this study uses the measure most frequently 
employed in the literature: the standard deviation of capital flows in a rolling window, also 
employed by Neumann et al. (2009), Mercado and Park (2011), and Lee et al. (2013). As in 
Broto et al. (2011) and Lee et al. (2013) the standard deviation of capital flows in a rolling 
window, σit, is expressed as follows: 
 
𝜎𝑖𝑡 = (
1
𝑛
∑ (flow𝑖𝑘 −  μ
𝑡
𝑘=𝑡−(𝑛−1)
)²)
1
2
 (3.2) 
 
where μ = 
1
𝑛
∑ .𝑡𝑘=𝑡−(𝑛−1) flowik, and flowik represents capital inflows relative to GDP for country 
i in period k. The capital inflows refer to FDI, portfolio equity, and cross-border bank lending. 
Following Lee et al. (2013) the study first normalises the capital flow size in a rolling window 
to account for sudden and inflated private capital flows since the 1990s. This is done by setting 
the largest flow in the window in absolute terms at 100 and adjusting the rest of the flows in 
the window accordingly. Three-year overlapping rolling windows are used as oppose to five-
year rolling windows to minimize data loss in the portfolio equity series. 
A further description of the variables and their data sources appear in Appendix 3.A. 
The theoretical underpinning of the model (equation 3.1) are based on two principles; the 
Global Factors (Push Determinants) of capital flow volatility and the Domestic Factors (Pull 
Determinants) of capital flow volatility. In the case of Global Factors (Push Determinants), this 
study uses global liquidity and global risk to capture Global Factors following Broto et al. 
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(2011) and Forbes and Warnock (2012). Broto et al. (2011) stated that for push determinants 
the relationship with capital flow volatility could be ambiguous. Stronger global real side 
conditions could render financial assets in advanced economies more attractive and 
subsequently reduce inflows to developing economies (World Bank, 2014). However, a 
decrease in global liquidity could also spark a flight to quality (Broto et al., 2011). The 
empirical findings of IMF (2007) and Mercado and Park (2011) revealed that an increase in 
global liquidity decreases capital inflow volatility. Similarly, this study expects a negative 
relationship between global liquidity and volatility a priori. However, greater uncertainty and 
risk aversion is likely to be associated with weaker capital flows (World Bank, 2014) and a 
positive association between global risk and volatility is expected is expected a priori.  
In the case of Domestic Macroeconomic Factors (Pull Determinants), this study uses GDP 
growth, exchange rate, trade openness, and financial openness to capture Domestic 
Macroeconomic Factors. According to Lee et al. (2013) a negative relationship is expected 
between GDP growth rate and capital inflow volatility, with the former regarded as a proxy for 
the dynamism of the host economy. This study, therefore, expects a negative relationship. The 
exchange rate is this study’s proxy for the quality of macroeconomic policies and a positive 
relationship with volatility is expected as capital inflows could be more volatile where erratic 
monetary conditions prevail. Martin and Rey (2006) analysed the effects of trade globalization 
on the likelihood of financial crashes in emerging economies and found that trade globalization 
decreases the chances of crashes. However, trade could be associated with higher capital inflow 
volatility in countries that rely on international trade. Countries that have a narrow export base 
could be more at risk when global conditions change (Broto et al., 2011). Mercado and Park 
(2011) found that trade openness increased the volatility of all capital flow types in developing 
Asia. This study also expected a positive relationship between trade openness volatility a priori.  
The findings of Neumann et al. (2009), Mercado and Park (2011) and Lee et al. (2013) reveal 
that the impact of financial openness on capital inflow volatility is not uniform across the 
different types of capital inflows. Mercado and Park (2011) found that financial openness 
increased the volatility of FDI inflows while decreasing that of foreign portfolio investment 
flows. As emerging markets ease capital movements, flows may become subject to sudden 
surges, stops or reversals. The a priori expectation for the expected coefficient for financial 
openness can, therefore, be either positive or negative. 
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As opposed to the studies of Mercado and Park (2011) and Lee et al. (2013) that used the 
popular Chinn-Ito (2008) Financial Openness Index as a de jure indicator of financial openness, 
this study employed a de facto financial openness indicator using the “External Wealth of 
Nations Mark II” database of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) that measures the stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities. The choice of financial openness indicator centres on the relative 
time-invariant character of the Chinn-Ito (2008) Index over the chosen time frame. This study 
also concerns the volatility dynamics of private capital flows actually happening and thus a de 
facto measure of financial openness is preferred. 
In the case of Domestic Financial Factors (Pull Determinants), this study uses private credit to 
capture a Domestic Financial Factor.  Broto et al. (2011) stated that higher levels of private 
credit could indicate a more developed banking system associated with lower volatility. 
Conversely higher levels of private credit signify economic overheating leading to capital 
inflow volatility. The a priori expectation for the expected coefficient for private credit can, 
therefore, be either positive or negative. 
3.3.3 Estimation technique 
Panel regressions are estimated using macro-level data for sub-Saharan African countries from 
1990 to 2011 for the FDI and portfolio equity volatility samples. For the cross-border bank 
lending volatility sample, the study used data from 1996 to 2011 reflecting data availability 
from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics. There are 39 countries in the FDI volatility sample, 
9 countries in the portfolio equity sample, and 33 countries in the cross-border bank lending 
volatility sample. Countries appear in Appendix 3.B.  
Given the nature of the panel, large N and large T, the study tests for cross-section dependence 
as well as unit roots. Pesaran’s (2004) cross-section dependence test (CD) and Pesaran’s (2007) 
cross-sectional augmented panel unit root test (CIPS) (Z(t-bar)) test for unit roots, since it also 
caters for cross-section dependence, were employed. The CIPS tests were estimated with a 
constant term and trend while the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS) panel unit root test was 
first run on each series using an Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) automatic lag selection 
process in order to identify the number of lags to be used for the CIPS tests. Tables 3.1-3.3 
report the tests for cross-section dependence and unit roots for the three different capital flow 
volatility samples. 
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Table 3.1: Tests for cross-section dependence and unit roots: FDI volatility sample 
 
Note:  # indicates that the panel is unbalanced with not enough common observations across 
the panel to perform Pesaran’s (2004) test. 
 Table 3.2: Tests for cross-section dependence and unit roots: Portfolio equity volatility 
sample 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable CD-test p-value Corr Abs(corr) CIPS p-value 
FDI volatility 22.10 0.000 0.151 0.307 -3.163 0.001 
Global liquidity 147.58 0.000 1.000 1.000 28.925 1.000 
Global risk 147.58 0.000 1.000 1.000 28.925 1.000 
Log GDP 112.87 0.000 0.839 0.839 2.109 0.983 
Exchange rate      95.48 0.000 0.653 0.653 1.084 0.861 
Trade openness      20.76 0.000 0.142 0.357 1.746 0.960 
Financial openness      23.94 0.000 0.426 0.426 2.825 0.998 
Private credit        n/a# n/a# n/a# n/a# -1.152 0.125 
Variable CD-test p-value Corr Abs(corr) CIPS p-value 
Portfolio equity volatility 2.18 0.029 0.080 0.256 -1.699 0.045 
Global liquidity 31.46 0.000 1.000 1.000 13.635 1.000 
Global risk 31.46 0.000 1.000 1.000 13.635 1.000 
Log GDP 29.72 0.000 0.945 0.945 1.849 0.968 
Exchange rate 24.35 0.000 0.774 0.774 -1.413 0.079 
Trade openness 3.29 0.001 0.105 0.326 0.711 0.726 
Financial openness 2.08 0.037 0.066 0.437 2.064 0.980 
Private credit 4.04 0.000 0.139 0.405 -0.582 0.280 
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 Table 3.3: Tests for cross-section dependence and unit roots: Cross-border bank lending 
volatility sample  
 
Note:  # indicates that the panel is unbalanced with not enough common observations across 
the panel to perform Pesaran’s (2004) test. 
 
From Table 3.1 (the FDI volatility sample) it can be seen that seven out of eight variables 
exhibit cross-section dependence. Credit to the private sector could not be tested due to 
numerous gaps in the series. Only FDI volatility was found to be stationary at levels with the 
rest of the variables containing unit roots. Table 3.2 (the portfolio equity volatility sample) 
shows that all the variables exhibit cross-section dependence. Two out of eight variables, 
portfolio equity volatility and exchange rate, were found to be stationary at levels with the rest 
of the variables containing unit roots. In Table 3.3 (the cross-border bank lending volatility 
sample) six out of eight variables exhibit cross-section dependence while credit to the private 
sector again could not be tested. Only cross-border bank lending volatility was found to be 
stationary at levels, with the rest of the variables each containing a unit root. Clearly there is a 
need to account for the cross-section dependence and non-stationarity in the panel.  
The recent non-stationary panel literature has focused on allowing general cross-section 
dependencies among panel members (Pedroni, Vogelsang, Wagner, & Westerlund, 2015). To 
account for this, the study estimates models using the AMG estimator of Eberhardt and Teal 
(2010), a technique that caters for residual cross-section dependence as well as non-stationary 
residuals. Standard panel estimation techniques (such as pooled OLS, fixed or random effects, 
Variable CD-test p-value Corr Abs(corr) CIPS p-value 
Bank lending volatility 0.79 0.431 0.007 0.261 -3.589 0.000 
Global liquidity 117.37 0.000 1.000 1.000 25.602 1.000 
Global risk 117.37 0.000 1.000 1.000 25.602 1.000 
Log GDP 97.65 0.000 0.832 0.913 1.548 0.939 
Exchange rate 33.29 0.000 0.285 0.600 1.988 0.977 
Trade openness 15.27 0.000 0.131 0.449 1.693 0.955 
Financial openness 28.03 0.000 0.239 0.544 0.063 0.525 
Private credit     n/a#     n/a#    n/a# n/a# 1.085 0.861 
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or GMM) do not necessarily produce consistent parameter estimates when the errors from a 
panel regression exhibit cross-section dependence (Kapetanios et al., 2011). 
3.4 Results and discussion 
3.4.1 Summary and descriptive statistics 
Table 3.4 provides descriptive statistics of the different private capital flow variables as well 
as the calculated volatility measures from 1990 to 2011. For the cross-border bank lending 
sample, the table reports data from 1996 when the BIS Locational Statistics’ data became 
available. 
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics  
 
Source: World Bank WDI online (2016) database and BIS Locational Banking Statistics 
(2014) 
Note:   FDI (fdi); portfolio equity (pe); cross-border bank lending (cb); FDI volatility (fdivol); 
portfolio equity volatility (pevol); cross-border bank lending volatility (cbvol). 
The descriptive statistics report that net FDI inflows to GDP has an average mean of 3.787, 
much higher than the net portfolio equity to GDP (0.008) and cross-border bank lending to 
GDP (0.990) average means. FDI is considered a more stable private capital flow since large, 
fixed and illiquid assets would be difficult to disinvest rapidly from compared to portfolio- and 
debt flows (Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi, & Yawson, 2013). FDI volatility (37.67) on average has 
been higher than cross-border bank lending volatility (22.15). Portfolio equity has the highest 
recorded volatility at 51.60. Figure 3.1 graphically depicts the calculated volatilities. 
       cbvol         668    22.14833    16.06479   .3684528   105.0894
       pevol         272    51.59815    24.13482   .8234217    106.375
      fdivol         962    37.66592    20.00908    1.60489   110.8398
          cb         669     .989707    7.373167  -.2548578   137.4378
          pe         300    .0080147    .0714518  -.0164958   .9993084
         fdi         967    3.787029    8.410295   -82.8921   91.00733
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
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Figure 3.1: Volatilities of private capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2011 
Source: Author’s calculations using WB WDI online (2016) database and BIS Locational 
Banking Statistics (2014) 
Note:  FDI volatility (FDIVOL); Portfolio equity volatility (PEVOL); Cross-border bank 
lending volatility (CBVOL).  
            The scale of the vertical axis is the calculated volatilities computed as the standard 
deviation of capital flows in three-year overlapping rolling windows with capital flow 
sizes first normalized. 
 
From Figure 3.1 it can be seen that FDI volatility has been steadily decreasing over the 
reporting period. This is encouraging as since 2000 there has been a steady increase in the FDI 
to GDP ratio.  
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3.4.2 Regression results 
The results are displayed in table 3.5 and show that the only significant factor that influences 
FDI volatility is global liquidity (push factor) where a negative relationship is found. Thus, an 
increase in global liquidity reduces the volatility of FDI. The result is similar to those of IMF 
(2007) and Mercado and Park (2011). As explained by Mercado and Park (2011), with 
increasing global liquidity, some of this will be channelled to emerging markets and the 
resultant shift in foreign investment could result in a reduction of FDI volatility. None of the 
pull factors significantly influences FDI volatility. 
Table 3.5: Determinants of private capital flow volatility 
 
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively with 
t-statistics in parentheses.  
Root mean square error (RMSE) indicates the residual size of each model.  
The figures reported for CD and CIPS tests are p-values. 
 
The only significant factor that influences FDI volatility is global liquidity (push factor) where 
a negative relationship is found. Thus, an increase in global liquidity reduces the volatility of 
FDI. The result is similar to those of IMF (2007) and Mercado and Park (2011). As explained 
by Mercado and Park (2011), with increasing global liquidity, some of this will be channelled 
  FDI volatility Portfolio equity volatility Bank lending volatility 
Global liquidity  -0.575** (-2.45) 0.930(1.21) -0.346(-1.50) 
Global risk  0.296(1.58) 1.133*(1.85) -0.120(-0.65) 
Log GDP  -16.427(-0.73) -7.948(-0.05) 15.071(0.46) 
Exchange rate  0.029(0.78) 2.180**(2.09) 0.053(1.16) 
Trade openness  -0.027(-0.24) 0.007(0.02) 0.185(1.14) 
Financial openness  0.043(1.02) -0.484***(-2.99) -0.078*(-1.80) 
Private credit  0.501(1.40) -2.159(-0.97) -1.680*(-1.70) 
RMSE  8.082 10.072 4.889 
Observations 
Countries 
       783 
        39 
       156 
          9 
       516 
         33 
CD     0.132    0.425     0.388 
CIPS     0.000    0.028     0.000 
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to emerging markets and the resultant shift in foreign investment could result in a reduction of 
FDI volatility. None of the pull factors significantly influences FDI volatility. 
For the portfolio equity volatility model one push and two pull factors are found to be 
significant drivers of volatility. Global risk is a global push factor significantly positively 
related to volatility, implying that greater global uncertainty and risk aversion substitutes flow 
away from developing economies resulting in weaker and more volatile flows. This is in line 
with Forbes and Warnock (2012) who found that global risk was significantly associated with 
extreme episodes of capital flows. 
With regard to the pull factors, the proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty (exchange rate) is 
significantly positively related to volatility, implying that a depreciating exchange rate 
increases the volatility of portfolio equity flows. An unstable macroeconomic outlook may 
cause investors to divert funds to safer investments resulting in weaker flows and increasing 
volatility. The findings here are similar to that of Mercado and Park (2011) who reported that 
greater exchange rate volatility leads to higher portfolio investment inflow volatility to 
emerging markets. 
In line with the findings of Mercado and Park (2011), another pull factor significant in the 
portfolio equity volatility model is actual financial openness that reduces volatility. The 
intuition behind the result mimics the explanation by Reinhardt, Ricci, and Tressel (2013) who 
showed that a closed capital account indicates weaker and thus more volatile flows. 
In the cross-border bank lending model, two pull factors significantly influence volatility. 
Financial openness is similarly significantly negatively related to volatility. Private credit to 
GDP as a domestic financial pull factor reduces the volatility of cross-border bank lending, 
implying that a well-functioning and deep financial system should help attract more stable 
cross-border bank flows. The last finding differs from Broto et al. (2011) who reported a 
positive association between private credit to GDP and bank inflow volatility. Broto et al.’s 
(2011) bank inflow volatility variable derives from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics’ 
“other investment” series, which contains other forms of cross-border finance and could 
explain the difference in results. 
The CD and CIPS tests of the residuals also show that the models are devoid of any cross-
section dependence and non-stationarity problems. 
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3.4.1 Robustness 
The samples are split according to country income groups per World Bank classification. This 
process makes it possible to ascertain if the determinants of FDI and cross-border bank lending 
volatility differ for middle-income countries (MICs) and low-income countries (LICs). The 
results appear in Appendixes 3.C and 3.D. The portfolio equity volatility sample consists 
mainly of MICs and is therefore excluded from this analysis. The CD test reveals that the FDI 
LIC volatility sample cross-section dependence is still prevalent in the residuals. The focus is 
thus on the FDI MIC volatility and the cross-border banking volatility (MIC and LIC) samples. 
The results do not differ much. Similar to the full country FDI sample, global liquidity is 
significantly negatively related to volatility in the FDI MIC sample. In addition, global risk 
increases FDI volatility in MICs. For MICs, global push factors, beyond the control of sub-
Saharan economies are the drivers of FDI volatility.  
For MICs in the cross-border bank lending volatility sample, financial openness reduces 
volatility similar to the finding from the full country sample. For LICs in the cross-border bank 
lending volatility sample, global liquidity reduces volatility while a depreciating exchange rate 
increases volatility. Apart from a global push factor, domestic macroeconomic fundamentals 
are therefore also relevant in shaping the volatility of cross-border bank lending flows to LICs. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The chapter presented evidence of the underlying factors of patterns of volatility for FDI, 
portfolio equity and cross-border bank lending inflows for sub-Saharan African countries. No 
other study has previously focused exclusively on sub-Saharan Africa when investigating the 
determinants of private capital flow volatility. This study is further unique in that it employs 
clearly-delineated cross-border bank lending data from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics 
that has not been used by similar prior studies. The use of a panel time-series estimator, the 
AMG estimator of Eberhardt and Teal (2010), makes the findings robust to cross-section 
dependence. 
The main findings of the study are as follows: (1) global liquidity lowers FDI volatility, while 
for MICs global liquidity and global risk are significant drivers of FDI volatility; (2) global 
risk increases portfolio equity volatility with the quality of macroeconomic policies and 
financial openness found to be important pull factors in lowering portfolio equity volatility; 
and (3) financial openness and depth lowers cross-border bank lending volatility. For LICs, 
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global liquidity lowers cross-border bank lending volatility while the quality of 
macroeconomic policies is an important pull factor in lowering volatility. 
The results indicate that global push factors influence the volatility of all three private capital 
inflow types, either for the full samples or when the samples are split according to country 
income group. Because these factors are beyond the control of sub-Saharan African economies 
it is difficult to draw blanket policy recommendations. Forbes and Warnock’s (2012) 
suggestion that countries apprehensive about capital flow volatility effects should seek to 
strengthen their capacity to endure these volatile capital episodes rather than reduce the 
volatility also seems appropriate for sub-Saharan African countries. The IMF (2014) 
recommended that most sub-Saharan African frontier economies improve the quality of their 
data in order to monitor capital flows effectively. To use macro-prudential policies effectively, 
supervisory resources that include adequately trained and qualified staff, the availability of 
high-frequency data and the tools necessary to assess systemic risks must all be improved (IMF, 
2014). 
The significance of global push factors in shaping volatility should also reinforce calls for 
reforming the global financial architecture that has gained weight since the global financial 
crisis. Global liquidity is likely to become more challenging in years ahead (Marcus, 2014). 
Sub-Saharan African countries should continue to claim greater representation in international 
financial institutions, as this will enable broader international policy coordination and ensure 
that the global financial architecture is more inclusive as well as more responsive to developing 
countries. 
Positively, some of the results also suggest that domestic (pull) factors significantly reduce the 
volatility of certain private capital inflow types without increasing that of others, suggesting 
that domestic policy still has a role to play. The results from the portfolio equity volatility 
sample and from the cross-border bank lending volatility LIC sample suggest that prudent 
domestic macroeconomic policies must be encouraged. It is easier to manage capital flows 
effectively if macroeconomic stability is ensured. Governments and Central Banks must put in 
place policies to maintain stability. 
The results also imply that it is important for sub-Saharan African countries to have an actual 
open capital account to lower the volatility of portfolio equity cross-border bank lending. While 
the effectiveness of capital controls on volatility was not directly tested, the results suggest that 
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being more financially open (and by implication having fewer capital controls) is more 
beneficial. 
Finally, the results imply that sub-Saharan African countries should further undertake to 
develop their financial institutions to increase access to credit and improve financial depth as 
this should lead to reduced cross-border bank lending volatility. 
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Appendix 3.A: Variables and data sources 
 
FDI inflows: net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. 
It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term 
capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment 
inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors, and is divided by 
GDP. Series obtained from World Bank WDI. 
Portfolio equity inflows: net inflows from equity securities other than those recorded as direct 
investment and including shares, stocks, depository receipts (American or global), and direct 
purchases of shares in local stock markets by foreign investors, and is divided by GDP. Series 
obtained from World Bank WDI. 
Cross-border bank lending: Following Kleimeier, Sander, and Heuchemer (2013) cross-border 
bank lending is based on the residency principle (similar to balance of payments data) and 
defined as the practice where a bank in one country makes a loan to a customer who resides in 
another country. The data is obtained from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics and is divided 
by GDP. 
Volatility of capital inflows: Standard deviation of capital inflows using three-year overlapping 
rolling windows with the method described in section 3.3.2. 
Global liquidity: World money and quasi money (M2) as a percentage of GDP obtained from 
the World Bank WDI. 
Global risk: The VIX index is a measure of the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index options 
and is seen as a simple proxy for investor risk appetite (IMF, 2013). Data are yearly averages 
and obtained from the BIS. 
GDP: GDP in constant 2005 US$ obtained from the World Bank WDI. 
Exchange rate: The official exchange rate determined by the by national authorities or the rate 
determined in the legally sanctioned exchange market with the series obtained from the World 
Bank WDI. 
Trade openness: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product with the series obtained from the World Bank WDI. 
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Financial openness: Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), the de facto financial openness 
indicator was calculated using the ratio of 
(𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡)
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
 with FA (FL) denoting the stock of 
external assets (liabilities). 
Private credit: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
(%) and obtained from the World Bank Global Financial Development database. 
Appendix 3.B: Sample countries 
 
FDI volatility sample: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Portfolio equity volatility sample: Botswana, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia. 
Cross-border bank lending sample: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo 
Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia. 
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Appendix 3.C: FDI volatility determinants according to country income 
level 
 
Table 3.6: Determinants of FDI volatility according to country income level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively with t-
statistics in parentheses.  
Root mean square error (RMSE) indicates the residual size of each model.  
The figures reported for CD and CIPS tests are p values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  FDI volatility (MIC)  FDI volatility (LIC) 
Global liquidity  -1.128** (-2.59)  -0.272(-1.51) 
Global risk  0.690***(3.04)  0.312(1.09) 
Log GDP  -18.372(-0.43)  3.931(0.12) 
Exchange rate  0.285(0.55)  -0.029(-0.95) 
Trade openness  0.056(0.36)  -0.190(-1.25) 
Financial openness  0.010(0.21)  0.138**(2.00) 
Private credit  0.587(0.84)  0.732(1.32) 
RMSE  8.011  8.173 
Observations 
Countries 
          373 
           18 
           410 
            21 
CD  0.393  0.024 
CIPS  0.000  0.000 
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Appendix 3.D: Cross-border bank lending volatility determinants according 
to country income level 
 
Table 3.7: Determinants of cross-border bank lending volatility according to country income 
level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively with t-
statistics in parentheses.  
Root mean square error (RMSE) indicates the residual size of each model.  
The figures reported for CD and CIPS tests are p values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Bank lending volatility (MIC)  Bank lending volatility (LIC) 
Global liquidity  0.084(0.33)  -0.843*(-1.94) 
Global risk  0.150(0.59)  -0.129(-0.59) 
Log GDP  0.281(0.01)  27.925(0.47) 
Exchange rate  0.101(0.56)  0.050*(1.69) 
Trade openness  0.110(1.58)  0.132(0.37) 
Financial openness  -0.101*(-1.84)  -0.087(-1.36) 
Private credit  -1.018(-1.00)  -2.820(-1.46) 
RMSE  4.439  5.222 
Observations 
Countries 
              251 
               16 
               265 
                17 
CD  0.196  0.932 
CIPS  0.000  0.000 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REMITTANCE VOLATILITY AND FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the effect of remittance volatility on financial sector development. This 
is important considering the increased importance of remittances as a source of external 
financing for sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, unlike in the past, it is now required that migrants 
transfer funds home through official channels (Adenutsi, Aziakpono, & Ocran, 2012) thereby 
impacting the formal financial system. With remittance levels complementing financial sector 
development in sub-Saharan Africa (Gupta, Patillo, & Wagh, 2009), it becomes necessary to 
investigate whether remittance volatility has an impact as well. 
Although still smaller than official development assistance and foreign direct investment 
inflows, remittances to sub-Saharan Africa have gradually increased, having reached an 
estimated figure of approximately US$32 billion in 2013 (Aga & Martinez Peria, 2014). For 
instance, remittances have increased from 1.6% of GDP in 2006 (Gupta et al., 2009) to 4% of 
GDP in 2012 (Aga & Martinez Peria, 2014). Several sub-Saharan African economies have 
started raising extensive external financing at lower interest rates and longer maturities through 
the securitization of future remittance flows (Jidoud, 2015).  
The relevance of remittances is not only connected to the size of the flows but also to the fact 
that these flows are stable and even move countercyclically (Sayan, 2006). This has become 
more apparent with the recent global financial crisis (Allen & Giovannetti, 2011). A better 
understanding of the consequences of remittance-receiving patterns – not only remittance 
levels – on the receiving economies will become more important in future years considering 
that the percentage of individuals living in countries other than those of their birth is rising 
(Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2012). For policies to leverage the most out of remittance inflows 
to developing countries it is essential that the predictability of remittances be given full 
attention (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2014). 
This study distinguishes between the effect of remittance volatility on financial sector depth 
and financial sector efficiency. Most studies within the remittances-financial development 
nexus focused on one characteristic of financial development (financial depth) while this study 
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extends this to include financial sector efficiency. The study further contributes to the literature 
by not only focusing on the financial development of banks but also investigating the impact 
of remittances and remittance volatility on stock markets. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of the 
relevant literature, Section 4.3 details the methodology employed in the empirical analysis, in 
Section 4.4 the results from the empirical estimations are presented and in Section 4.5 the 
chapter is concluded. 
4.2 Overview of the relevant literature 
4.2.1 Theoretical framework: Remittances and financial sector development 
The related literature has not provided a consistent theoretical framework that explains the link 
between remittances and financial deepening (Ajilore & Ikhide, 2012). Aggarwal, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2011) also stated that the link between remittances and financial 
development, especially for the banking sector, is a priori unclear. Nonetheless, there are 
several reasons why remittances could positively impact on banking sector development 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Cordova, Martinez Peria, & Woodruff, 2011). Firstly, due to remittances 
being lumpy because of the fixed costs associated with sending, households are settled with 
excess cash that could increase their demands for banking products as a place of safe storage. 
Secondly, bank branches might be used to collect interbank and wire transfers with banks in 
remittance-receiving countries charging processing fees for these transactions that could 
become a significant source of income. Banks can then expand their outreach to locate closer 
to recipients. Thirdly, a large portion of remittances are received by households that are 
possibly excluded from the formal financial sector, these households being in the middle and 
lower income distribution segments. Banks that act as remittance paying agents could, 
therefore, offer other banking products to unbanked households. Fourthly, by processing 
remittance flows banks are provided with information regarding the recipient households’ 
income that could be used to extend credit to otherwise misunderstood borrowers (Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2011). 
Remittances may also impact positively on stock market development. Through smoothing 
household consumption over time, spending could be delayed via saving and investment in the 
stock market. This is particularly so if typical asset accumulation products, e.g. pension funds, 
are lacking or not deemed dependable (Billmeier & Massa, 2009). At a macroeconomic level, 
Bugamelli and Paterno (2009) found that remittances improved financial stability in 
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developing countries by reducing the probability of current account reversals. In this instance, 
current account reversals are conceivably generated by sudden stops of foreign capital as a 
result of foreign investors’ loss of confidence due to worsening fundamentals such as lower 
reserves and higher external debt. A high level of stable remittances could negate worsening 
fundamentals from the viewpoint of foreign investors. Consequently, a high level of stable 
remittances would insulate a country from capital flight from the stock market and thus have a 
positive impact on stock market development. 
Another channel through which remittances may reduce vulnerability in an economy is through 
improving creditworthiness and facilitating access to international credit markets (Avendano, 
Gaillard, & Nieto-Parra, 2011). Avendano et al. (2011) built an empirical model for remittance-
dependent economies to capture the effect of remittances, through the solvency ratio and 
volatility of external flows, on credit rating agencies. Their results suggested that the impact of 
remittances on ratings is enhanced for small, low and middle-income economies. Ratings can 
also be assigned to unrated countries where remittance flows are high.  
However, remittances may also negatively impact on banking sector development. Remittances 
may help relax the financing constraints of individuals, inducing a lower demand for credit that 
mitigates credit market development (Aggarwal et al., 2011). In this instance, remittances act 
as a substitute for banking sector development. Coon (2014) states that the link between 
remittances and the financial sector is complex. Some financial sector services, e.g. wire-
transfer services, could act as complements while other services, e.g. small-business loans, as 
substitutes. 
Although the literature has examined the impact of remittance transfer costs on efficiency, there 
is a lack of studies on how remittances impact financial sector efficiency (Cooray, 2012). 
Changes in overhead and operating costs are reflected in bank interest rate margins that are 
passed on to depositors and lenders (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2004). Cooray (2012) argues 
that if remittances increase credit availability through larger deposits, remittances could 
contribute to lower overhead costs and net interest margins. Remittances that increase bank 
reserves in developing countries (Cooray, 2012) is a further channel that promotes efficiency. 
4.2.2 Theoretical framework: Remittance volatility and financial sector development 
On the subject of remittance volatility, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2014) hypothesized that 
households that receive remittances on an irregular and less predictable basis would be more 
inclined to use these funds towards asset accumulation. Their argument follows from the 
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lifecycle permanent income hypothesis and the precautionary saving motive theory. The former 
advocates that regular and permanent increases in income are consumed. Individuals expecting 
such income increments over the long run, would allow for an upward adjustment of 
consumption over their lifecycle. Households view irregular increases in income as ephemeral 
and cannot depend on them in the long run and are thus more likely to save (Amuedo-Dorantes 
& Pozo, 2014). The precautionary saving motive theory further supports the notion that 
irregular income is more likely to be saved. Households that find it difficult to predict future 
income flows will tend to save more to guard against future income shortfalls (Amuedo-
Dorantes & Pozo, 2014). If irregular remittance receipts are more likely to be saved, recipients 
could possibly have a need for financial products that would allow for the safeguarding of these 
funds, thereby positively influencing financial sector development. 
However, remittance fluctuations could also have a negative macroeconomic effect. 
Mandelman (2013) developed a heterogeneous agent model that analysed the role of monetary 
policy in a small open economy where remittance fluctuations are substantial. Impulse 
responses of the estimated model to a positive remittance shock indicated that households 
receiving an increase in disposable income record higher consumption levels, shrinking the 
labour supply because of an increased demand for leisure. As the labour supply decreases, real 
wages increase and are further stimulated by the consumption boost. Households subsequently 
react to higher wages by increasing their labour supply and aggregate employment increases 
slightly. The price of domestically produced goods is pressurized by the increasing real wages 
and consumption demand, and CPI inflation steadily rises. The central bank reacts and 
increases the domestic interest rate (Mandelman, 2013). This study therefore argues that 
remittance volatility could potentially be detrimental to financial sector development. 
4.2.3 Empirical review 
Similar to the theoretical literature, the empirical literature consists mostly of studies that 
examined the impact of remittances on financial development and little on the impact of 
remittance volatility on financial development.  
Results from Vargas-Silva (2007) suggest remittances had a positive impact on the general 
stock market index in Mexico, which is consistent with previous evidence that found 
remittances invested in productive activities in Mexico. Using a panel of 17 emerging countries 
in the Middle East and Central Asia, Billmeier and Massa (2009) also found that remittances 
had a significant positive impact on stock market capitalization. Gupta et al. (2009) pioneered 
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the empirical exploration of remittances’ financial deepening effects in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Covering six time periods composed of five-year averages from 1975-2004 for 44 economies 
and using a panel instrumental variable approach they found that remittances positively 
impacted on financial development.  
An important contribution to the related empirical literature was from Aggarwal et al. (2011) 
who investigated remittance flow data to 109 developing economies from 1975-2007 and the 
impact on financial sector development. The findings revealed a positive and robust link 
between remittances and financial development irrespective of the estimation technique 
employed or whether the ratio of deposits or credit to GDP was the financial development 
measure. 
Recent African panel data studies include the studies of Tarus (2015), Karikari, Mensah and 
Harvey (2016), and Williams (2016). Tarus (2015) found that remittances enhanced banking 
sector development for a sample of 23 sub-Saharan African countries from 1994-2009. The 
results from Karikari et al. (2016) generally indicated that remittances positively influenced 
certain aspects of financial development in Africa in the short-run but not in the long-run. It 
was explained that remittances are basically only used for survival purposes. Williams (2016) 
used a dynamic panel estimator for 45 sub-Saharan countries from 1970-2013 and showed that 
remittances positively influenced financial development. It was also found that the effect of 
remittances on financial development did not depend on democratic institutions. 
Evidence from time series studies suggest a positive relationship between remittances and 
financial development. Chowdhury (2011) employed the Johansen cointegration approach and 
found that remittances contributed positively to the financial system of Bangladesh. Ajilore 
and Ikhide (2012) used country-level data on Cape Verde, Lesotho, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo 
to explore the long- and short-run impact of remittances on financial development. The study 
employed both the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach and the 
Johansen approach to assess cointegration for the period 1985-2009 and reported that 
remittances promoted financial development in four of the countries studied except for Nigeria.  
Cooray’s (2012) study was the first to investigate the impact of remittances on banking sector 
efficiency. A sample of 94 non-OECD economies was used, and it was found that remittances 
contributed to increase the size and efficiency of the banking sector. It was also found that 
where government ownership of banks is lower, remittances had a greater impact in increasing 
banking sector size, while greater increases in efficiency were found where government 
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ownership of banks was higher. Similar to Aggarwal et al. (2011), Cooray (2012) employed 
dynamic panel estimation techniques to account for possible endogeneity bias in the 
explanatory variables. 
Not all empirical studies have found a positive relationship between remittances and financial 
sector development. Brown, Carmignani, and Fayad (2013) found little evidence that 
remittances promoted financial development in a sample of 138 countries from 1970-2005, and 
if anything the effect appeared negative albeit small. Brown et al. (2013) suggest there might 
be possible non-linearities in the remittances-financial development link and that, in general, 
findings regarding the impact of remittances are sensitive to the methodological approach. 
Using an ARDL bounds testing approach from 2000-2010, Raza and Jawaid (2014) found no 
causal link between remittances and stock market capitalization in 18 Asian countries. 
Coulibaly (2015) examined the causality between remittances and financial development in 19 
sub-Saharan African countries by employing a panel Granger causality approach. The study 
concluded that no strong evidence existed to support the view that remittances promoted 
financial development. Differences in sub-Saharan Africa country governance were put 
forward to explain the heterogeneity in the causality results from remittances to financial 
development. 
In summary, while most of the empirical literature has found a positive relationship between 
remittances and financial development at a macroeconomic level, evidence remains mixed. 
Prior studies generally investigate only one characteristic of financial development (financial 
depth) for financial institutions. The impact of remittances on stock market development and 
financial sector efficiency has received little attention. This study explores the gap in the 
literature regarding the link between remittance volatility and financial development for sub-
Saharan African countries at a macroeconomic level. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
Figure 4.1 depicts the time profile of remittances to 45 sub-Saharan African countries from 
1990-2011. 
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Figure 4.1: Remittances to sub-Saharan Africa: 1990-2011 
Source: World Bank WDI (2016) 
From Figure 4.1 it can be seen that personal remittances were under US$5 billion at the turn of 
the century. During the 2000s it would appear that remittances have increased in importance, 
with US$8.27 billion recorded in 2004 and a dramatic rise to US$19.98 billion in 2005. In 
2008, remittances stood at US$28.03 billion before declining to US$26.79 billion in 2009, 
perhaps due to the global financial crisis. However, remittances rose again in 2010 and 
US$29.58 billion was recorded in 2011. Nigeria is by far the leading remittances recipient 
country in sub-Saharan Africa, with US$20.6 billion recorded in 2011. This figure represents 
almost 70% of all personal remittances to sub-Saharan African countries in 2011. The next 
leading recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa for 2011 were Senegal (US$1.6 billion), 
South Africa (US$1.1 billion) and Kenya (US$0.9 billion). Table 4.4 in Appendix 4.A indicates 
personal remittances (% of GDP) to sub-Saharan African countries. 
4.3.2 Remittance volatility  
The study follows the procedure in Broto, Diaz-Cassou, and Erce (2011) and Lee, Park, and 
Byun (2013) to compute remittance volatility. As in Broto et al. (2011) and Lee et al. (2013) 
the standard deviation of capital flows in a rolling window, σit, is expressed as follows: 
 
𝜎𝑖𝑡 = (
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where μ = 1
𝑛
∑ .𝑡𝑘=𝑡−(𝑛−1) flowik, and flowik represents remittances for country i in period k. 
The study follows Lee et al. (2013) and first normalizes the size of the flows in each of the 
rolling windows. Because the standard deviation indicates dispersion from the mean, greater 
remittances flows (and hence greater means) might well exaggerate the volatility size over time 
if not normalized. Figure 4.2 shows the time profile of the volatility of remittances from 1991 
to 2011. The first three-year rolling window is from 1990-1992 and the midpoint, i.e. 1991, is 
then the first volatility measure. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Volatility of remittances: 1991-2011 
Source: Calculated from World Bank WDI (2016) 
Note:  The scale of the vertical axis is the calculated aggregate volatility computed as the 
standard deviation of remittances in three-year overlapping rolling windows with 
capital flow sizes first normalized. 
 
Figure 4.2 indicates that except for 1998-2001, remittances to sub-Saharan Africa have not 
been stable at the aggregate level. Table 4.5 in Appendix 4.A indicates the remittance volatility 
to individual sub-Saharan African countries. Here one can observe even higher volatility 
spreads across countries. For the full period, 1991-2011, remittance volatility ranged from a 
low of 6.5 in Namibia to 34.8 in Sierra Leone. The range from 2000-2011 shows the lowest 
volatility of 3.3 in South Africa compared to 37.7 calculated for Burundi. For the full period, 
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11 countries show an average volatility above the sample average while, from 2000-2011, 17 
countries have a higher average. Remittance volatility in Nigeria is higher than the average in 
all samples compared to the other leading remittance recipient countries of Senegal, South 
Africa and Kenya, where the volatility is lower than all the sample averages. 
4.3.3 Empirical model: Financial development of banks 
To test the impact of remittances and remittance volatility on the financial development of 
banks, the following dynamic model adapted from Aggarwal et al. (2011) is specified: 
 FD𝑖𝑡 =  α +  γFD𝑖,𝑡−1
+  β1Remit𝑖𝑡 +  β2VolRemit𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ +  ε𝑖𝑡 (4.2) 
 
The dependent variable (FD) refers to two alternative characteristics of financial development 
i.e. financial depth and financial efficiency. The model is estimated four times, using two 
measures of financial depth and two measures of financial efficiency. Remittances (Remit) and 
remittance volatility (VolRemit) are the main explanatory variables of interest. Xit represents a 
vector of control variables as standard determinants of banking sector development: country 
size, inflation, trade openness, and capital account openness. The variables are defined as 
follows: 
FD𝑖𝑡 = Financial depth is measured as deposit money banks’ assets to GDP and alternatively 
as liquid liabilities to GDP of country i at year t. Financial efficiency is measured as the net 
interest margin (defined as the accounting value of bank’s net interest revenue as a share of its 
average interest-bearing (total earning) assets) and alternatively bank overhead costs to total 
assets of country i at year t. 
Remit𝑖𝑡  = Personal remittances received/GDP of country i at year t. 
VolRemit𝑖𝑡 = Volatility of remittances measured as the standard deviation of personal 
remittances received/GDP in three-year overlapping rolling windows of country i at year t. 
Country size𝑖𝑡  = GDP (log) (constant 2005 US$) of country i at year t. 
Inflation𝑖𝑡 = Consumer price index (log) (2010=100) of country i at year t. 
Trade openness𝑖𝑡 = Trade/GDP of country i at year t. 
Capital account openness𝑖𝑡 = Stocks of foreign assets and liabilities/GDP of country i at year 
t. 
A further description of the variables and their data sources appear in Appendix 4.B. 
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Theoretical underpinning 
Following Jackman, Craigwell, and Moore (2009) and Nyamongo, Misati, Kipyegon, and 
Ndirangu (2012), both remittances and remittance volatility is included in the same empirical 
model as explanatory variables. In addition, the theoretical literature revealed that remittances 
and remittance volatility could impact differently on financial development.  
The link between remittances and financial development of banks is theoretically a priori 
unclear. Empirically, Gupta et al. (2009) showed that remittances impacted positively on 
financial development in sub-Saharan Africa, while Ajilore and Ikhide (2012) provided 
evidence of a positive link in four of the five sub-Saharan African countries they considered. 
However, Coulibaly (2015) found no strong evidence that remittances promoted financial 
development in sub-Saharan African countries.  
A remittance shock could result in real wages and consumption demand to increase which 
would cause interest rates to rise (Mandelman, 2013). Rising interest rates negatively impact 
on financial sector development, and hence it is possible that a negative relationship between 
remittance volatility and financial development could ensue. 
It is expected that country size is positively related to financial development. The larger the 
country size, the greater demand for an expanded financial intermediary sector (Chowdhury, 
2011). An increase in the inflation rate decreases the real return on financial assets that 
exacerbates credit market frictions that lead to credit rationing and less intermediary activity 
(Boyd, Levine, & Smith, 2001). The study therefore expects a negative relationship between 
inflation and financial development.  
Following Gupta et al. (2009) and Chowdhury (2011), trade and capital account openness are 
expected to be positively related to financial development. Increased openness in the goods 
and capital markets is expected to increase the demand for financial products, thereby 
expanding the formal financial system (Chowdhury, 2011). Rather than using the popular 
Chinn-Ito (2008) Capital Openness Index as a de jure indicator of openness, this study 
employed a de facto openness indicator using the “External Wealth of Nations Mark II” 
database (updated) of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) that measures the stocks of foreign assets 
and liabilities. The choice of openness indicator centres on the relative time-invariant character 
of the Chinn-Ito (2008) Index over the short selected time frame. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
63 
 
4.3.4 Empirical model: Stock markets 
To test the impact of remittances and remittance volatility regarding stock market development, 
the following model adapted from Billmeier and Massa (2009) is specified: 
 SD𝑖𝑡 =  α + β1Remit𝑖𝑡 +  β2VolRemit𝑖𝑡 +  γX𝑖𝑡
′ +  ε𝑖𝑡 (4.1) 
 
The dependent variable (SD) refers to two alternative characteristics of stock market 
development: stock market depth and stock market efficiency. Remittances (Remit) and 
remittance volatility (VolRemit) are the main explanatory variables of interest. Xit represents a 
vector of control variables as standard determinants of stock market development: income, 
inflation, domestic credit, trade openness, and capital account openness. The variables are 
defined as follows: 
SD𝑖𝑡 = Stock market depth is measured as stock market capitalization to GDP and alternatively 
as stock market total value traded to GDP of country i at year t. Stock market efficiency is 
measured as stock market turnover ratio of country i at year t.  
Remit𝑖𝑡 = Personal remittances received/GDP of country i at year t. 
VolRemit𝑖𝑡 = Volatility of remittances measured as the standard deviation of personal 
remittances received/GDP in three-year overlapping rolling windows of country i at year t. 
Income𝑖𝑡 = GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) of country i at year t. 
Inflation𝑖𝑡 = Consumer price index (log) (2010=100) of country i at year t. 
Domestic credit𝑖𝑡 = Private credit by deposit money bank other financial institutions/GDP of 
country i at year t. 
Trade openness𝑖𝑡 = Trade/GDP of country i at year t. 
Capital account openness𝑖𝑡 = Stocks of foreign assets and liabilities/GDP of country i at year 
t. 
A further description of the variables and their data sources appear in Appendix 4.B. 
Theoretical underpinning 
Remittances, as an external source of income, can contribute to disposable income for more 
investing in stocks and may prompt more stock market investment. This study therefore expects 
a positive relationship between remittances and stock market development. However, a 
remittance shock could also reduce disposable income and negatively impact stock market 
development. In addition, the theoretical model of Mandelman (2013) indicated that a 
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remittance shock could result in real wages and consumption demand increasing which would 
cause interest rates to rise. This would adversely impact financial intermediation, also 
negatively influencing stock market development. Therefore, a negative relationship between 
remittance volatility and stock market development is hypothesized. 
Higher income has a positive influence on stock market development (Garcia & Liu, 1999). 
With respect to inflation, domestic and foreign investors would be hesitant to invest in stock 
markets situated in countries where there are expectations of high inflation (Yartey & Adjasi, 
2007), suggesting a negative link between inflation and stock market development. Therefore 
a negative relationship between inflation and stock market development is hypothesized. 
Financial sector intermediary development can positively impact on stock market 
development. Banks thus act as complements to stock market development. Yartey (2007) 
found that financial intermediary development is an important determinant of African stock 
market development, and this study also expects a positive relationship between domestic 
credit and stock market development. 
An important source of financial development is trade openness (Zhang, Zhu, & Lu, 2015). 
Increased trade openness may trigger a demand for new financial products (Gries, Kraft, & 
Meierrieks, 2009). Similarly, a positive relationship between trade openness and stock market 
development is expected. A positive relationship between capital account openness and stock 
market development is expected as countries with more open capital accounts are likely to 
attract more portfolio flows. 
4.3.5 Estimation technique 
When investigating the link between remittances and banking sector development, endogeneity 
bias as a result of reverse causality is a concern (Aggarwal et al., 2011). Greater financial 
development could lead to larger measured remittances because more remittances are measured 
when channelled through the formal financial system. Also, financial development could lower 
the cost of remittance transfer thereby leading to an increase in such flows (Aggarwal et al., 
2011). To estimate models employed in this study using panel least square estimators could 
therefore lead to endogeneity bias. Generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators are 
designed for panel analysis where one of the assumptions regarding the data-generating process 
are that some regressors could be endogenous (Roodman, 2009). To correct for the possible 
endogeneity bias in the explanatory variables, this study employs panel GMM estimation 
techniques using the Arellano & Bover (1995) method. This method is useful for our sample 
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for it caters for panels with gaps, a feature of sub-Saharan African panel datasets. For small T 
panels, fixed- or random-effects estimators or fixed-effects estimators combined with 
instrumental-variable estimators such as GMM are usually relied on (Blackburne & Frank, 
2007). Sample countries are provided in Appendix 4.C. 
4.4 Results and discussion 
Table 4.1: Remittances, remittance volatility and financial depth of banks: system GMM 
estimation 
    
    
 Deposit money 
bank assets/GDP 
 
Liquid 
liabilities/GDP 
 
Lag of dependent variable 
Remittances 
0.960***(0.018) 
-0.056(0.034) 
0.821***(0.035) 
-0.063(0.072) 
 
Remittance volatility -0.071***(0.024) 0.032(0.041)  
Log GDP 0.107(0.127) -0.071(0.173)  
Log CPI 
Financial openness 
Trade openness 
 
0.115(0.655) 
0.001**(0.001) 
0.001(0.008) 
1.159(0.210) 
0.001***(0.001) 
0.033(0.024) 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.743 
0.116 
 
0.200 
0.246 
 
Observations      260      269  
Countries      35      36  
    
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 4.2: Remittances, remittance volatility and financial efficiency of banks: system GMM 
estimation 
    
    
 Net interest 
margin 
 
Overhead costs to 
total assets 
 
Lag of dependent variable 
Remittances 
0.762***(0.045) 
-0.005(0.012) 
0.377***(0.087) 
0.006(0.021) 
 
Remittance volatility 0.019*(0.011) 0.038***(0.015)  
Log GDP 0.044(0.074) 0.054(0.085)  
Log CPI 
Financial openness 
Trade openness 
 
0.034(0.386) 
-0.001***(0.001) 
0.001(0.004) 
0.436(0.429) 
-0.001***(0.001) 
-0.001(0.008) 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.381 
0.544 
 
0.571 
0.153 
 
Observations      251      251  
Countries      33      33  
    
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 4.3 presents results for banks’ financial depth models. The lagged values of the 
dependent variables for the deposit money bank assets/GDP and liquid liabilities/GDP models 
are statistically significant, indicating a high level of persistency in financial depth. 
This study hypothesized that remittance volatility will negatively impact on financial sector 
development. In Table 4.3 evidence is provided to support this notion as a statistically 
significant and negative relationship is found between remittance volatility and deposit money 
bank assets/GDP. The finding can be explained by Mandelman’s (2013) theoretical model that 
predicts that a remittance shock would lead to higher consumption, decreasing labour supply 
and higher real wages. Subsequently the price of domestically produced goods would come 
under pressure, with central banks hiking interest rates to contain inflation. Therefore, financial 
depth would be adversely affected. However, the remittance volatility coefficient is not found 
to be significant in the liquid liabilities/GDP model. 
Contrary to the findings of Gupta et al. (2009) for sub-Saharan Africa, no evidence in either of 
the financial depth models is found that remittances act as a positive determinant of financial 
development. The findings are in line with Coulibaly (2015) who also found no strong evidence 
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to support the notion that remittances promote financial development in sub-Saharan African 
countries. However, some evidence was found that remittance volatility negatively impacts on 
financial sector depth as previously explained. 
Capital account openness has a significant positive coefficient in both the deposit money bank 
assets/GDP and liquid liabilities/GDP models. Gupta et al. (2009) also indicated that capital 
account openness positively relates to financial development. 
Table 4.4 presents results for banks’ financial efficiency models. The lagged values of the 
dependent variables for the net interest margin and overhead costs to total assets models are 
statistically significant, also indicating a high level of persistency in financial efficiency. 
In both the net interest margin and overhead costs to total assets models, evidence is found that 
remittance volatility is detrimental to banks’ financial efficiency. An increase in remittance 
volatility would increase banks’ net interest margins and overhead costs to total assets. Banks 
end up charging more and/or asking for profit with increased remittance volatility. 
In both the net interest margin and overhead costs to total assets models, no evidence is found 
of a relationship between remittances and banks’ financial efficiency. This evidence is contrary 
to the findings of Cooray (2012), where for 94 countries an increase in remittances leads to a 
decrease in overhead costs and net interest margins. 
In both the net interest margin and overhead costs to total assets models, capital account 
openness has a statistically negative coefficient. An increase in capital account openness lowers 
net interest margins and overhead costs to total assets. Cooray (2012) provided some evidence 
that capital account openness enhances banks’ financial efficiency. 
The post-estimation diagnostics is as expected in all models, with the Sargan test of over-
identification failing to reject the null hypothesis that the over-identification restrictions are 
valid. Regarding the Arellano and Bond GMM procedure that tests for first order and second 
order serial correlation in the disturbances, the null hypothesis of the absence of first order 
serial correlation should be rejected while one should not reject the absence of second order 
serial correlation (Baltagi, Demetriades, & Law, 2009). 
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Table 4.3: Remittances, remittance volatility and stock market development 
     
     
 Stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
 
Stock market total 
value traded/GDP 
 
Stock market 
turnover ratio 
 
Remittances 0.384(0.929) -0.114(0.495) 0.447*(0.259)  
Remittance volatility 0.130(0.173) -0.044(0.088) -0.040(0.051)  
Income -0.002(0.004) 0.006(0.003) -0.001(0.001)  
Inflation 
Domestic credit 
Trade openness 
Financial openness 
 
R2 
-1.913(6.123) 
1.470***(0.212) 
0.189(0.125) 
0.005(0.063) 
 
31.79 
-9.612**(3.364) 
1.200***(0.217) 
0.057(0.050) 
0.041**(0.017) 
 
    55.68 
-1.747(1.718) 
0.382***(0.047) 
0.001(0.033) 
-0.008(0.018) 
 
    21.93 
 
Observations 97     101      94  
Countries 
Hausman (p-value) 
Estimator 
   12  
0.929 
Random Effects 
    12 
0.030 
Fixed Effects 
     12 
0.345 
Random Effects 
 
     
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 4.3 presents results for stock markets’ financial depth models: the stock market 
capitalization/GDP model and the stock market total value traded/GDP model. Table 4.3 also 
presents the results for one indicator of stock market efficiency: the stock market turnover ratio 
model.  
While a GMM estimator is appropriate for the bank models, using that estimator for the stock 
market models results in instrument proliferation because of the low number of countries and 
observations. The F-test is firstly used to test the validity of the fixed effects models in relation 
to the pooled models. For all stock market models, the F-test enables the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of homogeneity at 1% level and thus it is concluded that individual-specific factors 
are present that drive stock market development. The models that are therefore applicable are 
either fixed effect or random effect. For the stock market total value traded/GDP model, the 
Hausman-test leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis that random effects provide 
consistent estimates. A fixed effects model with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors is used for the 
stock market total value traded/GDP model. For the stock market capitalization/GDP model 
and stock market turnover ratio model, the Hausman test’s null hypothesis could not be 
rejected, and random effects models are specified. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
69 
 
Remittances significantly impact stock market efficiency (as measured by the turnover ratio) 
but do not significantly impact stock market size and depth. Remittance volatility has no 
significant effect on any of the stock market indicators. 
The leading determinant of stock market development is domestic credit, which has a 
significant positive coefficient at a 1% level in all three models. Banking sector development 
therefore complements stock market development in sub-Saharan Africa. Yartey (2007) also 
found that financial intermediary development is an important determinant of stock market 
development in Africa.  
As expected, inflation has a statistically negative coefficient in the stock market total value 
traded/GDP model, and also model as expected. Capital account openness has a statistically 
positive coefficient in the stock market total value traded/GDP. 
4.4.1 Robustness 
Finally, to check the robustness of the results, this study re-estimated the models in two 
variations. The first variation has remittances as one of the explanatory variables, and there is 
no remittance volatility. The second variation has remittance volatility as one of the 
explanatory variables, but does not have the remittances variable. The results are reported in 
Appendix 4.D do not differ from the main results. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This study provides some evidence that remittance volatility is detrimental to banking sector 
depth. The results further indicate that remittance volatility increases bank spread and 
negatively affects banking sector efficiency. A remittance shock would result in real wages and 
consumption demand increasing, causing interest rates to rise and thus negatively impacting 
banking sector development (Mandelman, 2013). No evidence is found that remittance 
volatility is related to stock market development. A policy implication is that sub-Saharan 
African countries should have measures in place to monitor the predictability of remittances. 
This is important as sub-Saharan Africa is the third highest recipient of remittances as a 
percentage of GDP (Adenutsi et al., 2012). 
The policy question regarding the cost of remittance transfer also needs to be looked at. Freund 
and Spatafora (2008) provided evidence that high transaction costs deter migrants from sending 
money home or else using informal channels to remit. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the most 
expensive region to send money to (World Bank, 2015). A natural question pertains to whether 
the volatility of remittances could be linked to the associated transaction cost. In other words, 
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do some remittances end up via informal channels due to the high cost of transfer and 
subsequently result in irregularity and volatility of flow in the formal financial system? 
Lowering transaction costs should result in more remittances being channelled through formal 
channels, making flows more predictable and less volatile. The formal financial sector should 
also investigate which other financial demands remittance-recipients have beyond just offering 
savings accounts. Further research is required to ascertain whether linking remittances with 
additional financial services may generate positive economic change. 
It is important to note that the link between remittances and the financial sector is complex, 
where some financial sector services, e.g. wire-transfer services, could act as complements 
while other services, e.g. small-business loans, could act as substitutes (Coon, 2014). Empirical 
analysis at microeconomic level regarding the impact of remittances on recipient households’ 
use of bank services is still limited to a relatively small number of countries (Brown et al., 
2013) and could provide scope for future research, seeing that empirical analysis at 
macroeconomic level have yielded mixed results thus far. 
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Appendix 4.A: Remittances and remittance volatility in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Table 4.4: Remittances to sub-Saharan African countries (% of GDP)  
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Benin 5.2 4.6 3.3 3.1 4.0 2.9 1.8 2.0 2.2 
Botswana 2.3 1.3 0.3 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Burkina Faso 4.5 3.3 2.6 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 2.1 
Burundi n/a n/a n/a 0.01 0.01 0.2 1.6 1.7 1.9 
Cabo Verde 19.3 21.7 16.1 14.1 9.2 8.7 8.0 7.9 9.5 
Cameroon 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.8 
Congo, DR n/a n/a n/a 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 
Congo, Rep 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Côte d’Ivoire 0.4 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.5 1.6 
Ethiopia 0.04 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.8 1.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 
Gambia n/a n/a n/a 9.5 7.0 6.7 8.9 12.1 11.9 
Ghana 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 5.4 
Guinea 0.7 0.02 0.04 1.4 0.4 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.3 
Guinea-Bissau 0.4 0.7 2.2 3.4 6.2 5.7 5.9 5.4 4.7 
Kenya 1.6 3.3 4.2 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.2 
Lesotho 78.6 47.7 61.9 43.8 39.9 35.3 32.0 27.9 25.7 
Liberia n/a n/a n/a 5.8 8.4 6.8 2.2 2.4 23.3 
Malawi n/a 0.03 0.04 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Mali 4.0 4.1 2.5 2.8 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.4 6.0 
Mauritius n/a 3.3 3.9 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Mozambique 2.8 2.3 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 
Namibia 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Niger 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.6 
Nigeria 0.03 2.8 3.0 13.0 10.8 9.2 10.8 5.3 5.0 
Rwanda 0.1 1.6 0.4 0.3 3.2 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.7 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
n/a n/a n/a 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.0 3.3 2.9 
Senegal 2.5 3.0 5.0 9.1 10.6 11.0 10.5 11.4 11.2 
Seychelles 2.0 0.1 0.5 1.3 0.5 0.3 1.9 1.8 2.4 
Sierra Leone 0.01 2.7 1.1 0.1 1.9 0.9 1.4 1.7 2.0 
South Africa 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Sudan 0.5 2.5 5.2 2.7 2.2 2.9 2.6 2.2 1.2 
Swaziland 10.1 4.9 3.7 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.0 1.5 0.8 
Tanzania n/a 0.02 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.2 
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Togo 1.7 1.1 2.6 9.1 11.3 10.7 10.6 10.6 6.5 
Uganda n/a n/a 3.8 3.6 3.7 5.1 4.4 3.8 4.0 
Zambia n/a n/a n/a 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 
 
Source: World Bank WDI (2016) 
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Table 4.5: Remittance volatility to sub-Saharan African countries 
Country Average volatility 
1991-2011 
Average volatility 
2000-2011 
Average volatility 
2007-2011 
Benin 17.6 20.2 18.4 
Botswana 17.1 19.5 25.9 
Burkina Faso 12.5 12.2 4.6 
Burundi n/a 37.7 34.6 
Cabo Verde 9.7 8.6 9.4 
Cameroon 21.3 19.4 16.4 
Congo, DR n/a 29.8 31.8 
Congo, Rep 26.4 31.0 n/a 
Côte d’Ivoire 9.6 7.0 16.9 
Ethiopia 28.0 25.3 21.6 
Gambia n/a 13.8 16.2 
Ghana 14.2 12.5 6.2 
Guinea 34.2 32.0 22.7 
Guinea-Bissau 15.0 15.0 7.5 
Kenya 13.2 11.5 9.1 
Lesotho 10.4 9.1 9.3 
Liberia n/a 35.4 38.4 
Malawi 15.7 15.1 16.5 
Mali 9.7 9.5 9.6 
Mauritius 16.8 21.1 18.3 
Mozambique    13.9 12.2 8.6 
Namibia   6.5 6.6 8.7 
Niger 20.9 14.8 9.2 
Nigeria 24.9 21.2 16.8 
Rwanda 27.9 22.6 22.9 
Sao Tome and Principe n/a 21.2 23.1 
Senegal 7.3 8.5 3.9 
Seychelles 34.3 32.2 32.3 
Sierra Leone 34.8 30.7 21.4 
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South Africa 8.4 3.3 3.1 
Sudan 24.0 19.4 24.4 
Swaziland 10.5 11.3 19.4 
Tanzania 24.2 18.6 16.3 
Togo 17.6 12.8 2.4 
Uganda        n/a 12.9 9.4 
Zambia      n/a 15.3 15.5 
Average 18.2 18.0 16.3 
 
Source: Calculated from World Bank WDI (2016) 
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Appendix 4.B: Variables and data sources 
 
Financial development (banks): Financial depth is measured as deposit money banks’ 
assets/GDP and alternatively as liquid liabilities/GDP. Following Cooray (2012), financial 
efficiency is measured as the net interest margin and alternatively bank overhead costs to total 
assets. The variables are obtained from the World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database. 
Financial development (stock markets): Financial depth is measured as stock market 
capitalization/GDP and alternatively as stock market total value traded/GDP. Financial 
efficiency is measured as stock market turnover ratio. Stock market turnover ratio is the ratio 
of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization. The variables are 
obtained from the World Bank Global Financial Development Database. 
Remittances: The study uses the recent estimate of personal remittances received/GDP where 
the data are the sum of personal transfers and compensation of employees as defined in the 
sixth edition of the IMF’s Balance of Payments Manual with data obtained from the World 
Bank WDI. Personal transfers comprise current transfers in cash or in kind that was made or 
received between resident households/individuals and non-resident households/individuals. 
The compensation of employees concerns the income of border, seasonal as well as other short-
term employees that are employed in a country where they are not resident and also of residents 
being employed by non-residents. 
Volatility of remittances: Standard deviation of personal remittances received/GDP using 
three-year overlapping rolling windows with the method described in section 4.3.2. 
Country size (Banks): GDP in constant 2005 US$ obtained from the World Bank WDI. 
Income (Stock markets): GDP per capita in constant 2005 US$ obtained from the World Bank 
WDI. 
Inflation: Consumer price index (log) (2010=100) reflects changes in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. The series is obtained from the World 
Bank WDI. 
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Domestic credit (Stock markets): Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP (%) with the series obtained from the World Bank Global Financial 
Development database. 
Trade openness: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP 
with the series obtained from the World Bank WDI. 
Financial openness: The Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) “External Wealth of Nations Mark 
II” database (updated) was used to calculate the de facto financial openness indicator using the 
ratio of 
(𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡)
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
 with FA (FL) denoting the stock of external assets (liabilities). 
Appendix 4.C: Sample countries 
 
Banking sector development models: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. 
Stock market development models: Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
77 
 
Appendix 4.D: Robustness 
Table 4.6: Remittances, remittance volatility and financial depth of banks: system GMM 
estimation 
    
    
 Deposit money 
bank assets/GDP 
 
Deposit money bank 
assets/GDP 
 
Lag of dependent variable 
Remittances 
0.968***(0.018) 
-0.023(0.031) 
0.966***(0.018) 
    n/a 
 
Remittance volatility     n/a -0.064***(0.024)  
Log GDP -0.003(0.118) 0.114(0.127)  
Log CPI 
Financial openness 
Trade openness 
 
0.451(0.610) 
0.001*(0.001) 
-0.005(0.007) 
0.078(0.655) 
0.001**(0.001) 
-0.006(0.006) 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.259 
0.306 
 
0.823 
0.130 
 
Observations      277      260  
Countries      35      36  
    
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses.  
Table 4.7: Remittances, remittance volatility and financial depth of banks: system GMM 
estimation 
    
    
 Liquid 
liabilities/GDP 
 
Liquid 
liabilities/GDP 
 
Lag of dependent variable 
Remittances 
0.830***(0.029) 
-0.046(0.076) 
0.827***(0.031) 
    n/a 
 
Remittance volatility     n/a 0.036(0.043)  
Log GDP -0.062(0.156) -0.039(0.178)  
Log CPI 
Financial openness 
Trade openness 
 
1.222(0.829) 
0.001***(0.001) 
0.030(0.022) 
1.000(0.970) 
0.001***(0.001) 
0.026(0.018) 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.297 
0.229 
 
0.212 
0.246 
 
Observations      286      269  
Countries      36      36  
    
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
78 
 
Table 4.8: Remittances, remittance volatility and financial efficiency of banks: system GMM 
estimation 
    
    
 Net interest 
margin 
 
Net interest margin  
Lag of dependent variable 
Remittances 
0.754***(0.043) 
-0.001(0.015) 
0.762***(0.044) 
    n/a 
 
Remittance volatility     n/a 0.019*(0.011)  
Log GDP 0.120(0.109) 0.045(0.074)  
Log CPI 
Financial openness 
Trade openness 
 
-0.217(0.530) 
-0.001**(0.001) 
-0.002(0.004) 
0.029(0.391) 
-0.001***(0.001) 
0.001(0.003) 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.105 
0.330 
 
0.385 
0.547 
 
Observations      265      251  
Countries      34      33  
    
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses.  
Table 4.9: Remittances, remittance volatility and financial efficiency of banks: system GMM 
estimation 
    
    
 Overhead costs to 
total assets 
 
Overhead costs to 
total assets 
 
Lag of dependent variable 
Remittances 
0.455***(0.086) 
-0.004(0.016) 
0.377***(0.089) 
    n/a 
 
Remittance volatility     n/a 0.038***(0.014)  
Log GDP 0.096(0.078) 0.051(0.087)  
Log CPI 
Financial openness 
Trade openness 
 
0.267(0.376) 
-0.001**(0.001) 
-0.002(0.006) 
0.441(0.433) 
-0.001***(0.001) 
-0.001(0.006) 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.004 
0.098 
 
0.567 
0.153 
 
Observations      265      251  
Countries      34      33  
    
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 4.10: Remittances, remittance volatility and stock market development 
    
    
 Stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
 
Stock market 
capitalization/GDP 
 
Remittances 
Remittance volatility 
0.352(0.907) 
    n/a 
    n/a 
    0.132(0.173) 
 
Income    -0.001(0.004) -0.002(0.004)  
Inflation -2.252(5.915) -1.622(6.072)  
Domestic credit 
Trade openness 
Financial openness 
 
1.464***(0.200) 
0.178(0.118) 
-0.009(0.054) 
1.482***(0.202) 
0.175(0.123) 
0.005(0.063) 
 
R2      31.80      31.42  
Observations      101      97  
Countries      12      12  
Estimator Random Effects Random Effects  
    
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 4.11: Remittances, remittance volatility and stock market development 
    
    
 Stock market 
total value 
traded/GDP 
 
Stock market total 
value traded/GDP 
 
Remittances 
Remittance volatility 
-0.128(0.494) 
    n/a 
    n/a 
   -0.043(0.086) 
 
Income    0.005*(0.003) 0.006(0.003)  
Inflation -9.208***(2.679) -9.616**(3.304)  
Domestic credit 
Trade openness 
Financial openness 
 
1.198***(0.227) 
0.743(0.048) 
0.025*(0.012) 
1.198***(0.211) 
0.057(0.048) 
0.042**(0.017) 
 
R2      54.75      55.65  
Observations      105      101  
Countries      12      12  
Estimator Fixed Effects Fixed Effects  
    
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4.12: Remittances, remittance volatility and stock market development 
    
    
 Stock market 
turnover ratio 
 
Stock market 
turnover ratio 
 
Remittances 
Remittance volatility 
0.433*(0.255) 
    n/a 
    n/a 
   -0.041(0.051) 
 
Income    -0.001(0.001) -0.001(0.001)  
Inflation -1.732(1.666) -1.606(1.735)  
Domestic credit 
Trade openness 
Financial openness 
 
0.379***(0.049) 
0.010(0.032) 
-0.006(0.015) 
0.384***(0.048) 
0.002(0.033) 
-0.009(0.018) 
 
R2      20.80      20.19  
Observations      98      94  
Countries      12      12  
Estimator Random Effects Random Effects  
    
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CROSS-BORDER BANKING VOLATILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the effect of cross-border banking volatility on economic growth in 
Africa. Cross-border bank lending in Africa has increased tremendously over the past decade, 
with most of the flows being directed to middle-income countries (Hou, Keane, Kennan, 
Massa, & te Velde, 2013). Not only have European banks significantly increased their exposure 
in the past decade but other emerging economies, e.g. Brazil and India, have similarly increased 
lending to the region. Using the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Consolidated Banking 
Statistics, Hou et al. (2013) estimated cross-border bank lending to sub-Saharan Africa at 
US$138 billion in September 2012, which is much higher than the reported foreign direct 
investment (FDI) net inflows (US$40.9 billion), bond flows (US$6 billion), and portfolio 
equity net inflows (US$8.3 billion) combined for 2011. 
However, cross-border bank lending has not received much attention in the empirical literature 
until recent times (Herrmann & Mihaljek, 2013). Studies that have attempted to fill this gap in 
the literature include the work of Bruno and Shin (2013), Kleimeier, Sander, and Heuchemer 
(2013) and Müller and Uhde (2013). An important and yet hardly explored area is the impact 
of cross-border banking volatility on economic growth. Herrmann and Milhaljek (2013) state 
that cross-border banking, similar to portfolio equity and bond flows, tends to be highly volatile 
affecting macroeconomic and financial stability. 
African country research must analyse the effect of cross-border banking volatility on growth 
because empirical evidence has revealed that cross-border banking exacerbates global financial 
shocks (Beck, Fuchs, Singer, & Witte, 2014). Foreign banks almost completely dominate the 
banking sectors of some African countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, and Zambia. In countries such as Botswana, Namibia, Niger, and 
Senegal foreign banks control between 60%–80% of total banking sector assets (Beck et al., 
2014). Total foreign claims on developing countries held by banks reporting to the BIS 
decreased by US$500 billion in the second half of 2008 and the long-term effects on growth 
could be substantial (Brambila-Macias, Massa, & Murinde, 2011). It is, therefore, important to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
86 
 
appreciate that the potential benefits of more cross-border banking flows might be conditional 
on their volatility and this necessitates further examination. Private capital flow shocks can be 
responsible for the poor response of sub-Saharan African countries’ economic performance to 
private capital inflows (Alley, 2015). 
Studies that have attempted to examine the relationship between cross-border bank lending and 
economic growth for sub-Saharan African countries include those of Brambila-Macias and 
Massa (2010) and Brambila-Macias et al. (2011). This study is motivated in two ways. Unlike 
the previously mentioned sub-Saharan African studies, this study examines the impact of cross-
border banking volatility on economic growth. Also, the study distinguishes between loans and 
deposits and analyses their impact on economic growth separately. Both cross-border bank 
lending and deposits could have an impact on economic growth, but this impact could vary. 
For instance, depositors may engage in capital flight at times of crises while habit persistence 
characterized by high switching and information costs are more expected for cross-border loans 
(Kleimeier et al., 2013). 
While the terms cross-border bank lending and cross-border banking are used at times 
interchangeably in the literature, it is important to note that there is a difference. Kleimeier et 
al. (2013) use the term cross-border banking to refer to both banks as well as banking customers 
that “go abroad”. Sander, Kleimeier, and Heuchemer (2013) state that an emerging consensus 
in the literature proposes that cross-border banking analysis must focus on gross as opposed to 
net stocks and flows. Hence, this brings to the fore the importance of differentiating between 
assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits). Kleimeier et al. (2013) found that cross-border banking 
loans and deposits responded differently according to different types of financial crisis and 
concluded that future studies should explicitly and separately analyse both banking markets. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides an overview of the 
relevant literature, Section 5.3 details the methodology employed in the empirical analysis, in 
Section 5.4 the results of the empirical estimations are presented and in Section 5.5 the chapter 
is concluded. 
5.2 Overview of the relevant literature 
5.2.1 Theoretical framework 
Private capital flows can enhance growth through various channels: by increasing the domestic 
investment rate, through spurring investment associated with positive spill overs, and by 
leading to increased domestic financial intermediation (Bailliu, 2000).  
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This paper uses an extension of the endogenous growth model, the ‘AK’ model, of Pagano 
(1993) to examine the link between capital flows and growth. The potential effects of changes 
in financial variables (financial development and capital flows) on steady-state growth through 
their impact on capital accumulation are highlighted by an endogenous growth framework 
(Bailliu, 2000). 
Following Pagano (1993), in the closed economy version of the ‘AK’ model, aggregate output 
is a linear function of aggregate capital stock: 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝑡  (5.1) 
In the stated growth function, 𝑌𝑡  represents aggregate output in time t, 𝐾𝑡 signifies capital stock 
in time t, while 𝛽 is the marginal productivity of capital. The following assumptions are made: 
(i) there is no population growth, and (ii) the economy only produces one good that can be 
consumed or invested. If the single good is invested and assuming capital stock depreciates at 
a rate of α per period, gross investment equals: 
 𝐼𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝐾𝑡 (5.2) 
Aggregate investment is a change in aggregate capital stock less depreciation (α).  In a closed 
economy with capital market equilibrium state, all savings are channelled to investment: 
 𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 (5.3) 
To transform savings into investment involves the financial sector through financial 
intermediation and a proportion of savings (1 – δ) is lost for services rendered. For each 
proportion of savings, δS invested, ensures capital market equilibrium: 
 𝛿𝑆𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 (5.4) 
From equations (5.1), (5.2) and (5.4), and after eliminating the time indices, the growth rate of 
output (g) in a closed economy with financial intermediation is given by: 
 
𝑔𝑦 =  𝛽 (
𝐼
𝑌
) −  𝛼 =  𝛽𝛿𝑠 −  𝛼  (5.5) 
In equation (5.5), 𝑠 represents the gross savings rate. Two main channels through which 
financial development can impact economic growth are revealed by this equation. The first 
channel concerns the efficient allocation of savings to investment. As banks increase their 
intermediary role, they are likely to become more efficient with the spread between their 
lending and borrowing rates decreasing. The proportion of savings channelled to investment 
will increase, hence 𝑔 in equation (5.5) will increase as a result of an increase in 𝛿. The second 
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channel involves the allocation of capital. As banks increase their intermediary role, they are 
likely to gain experience in evaluating alternative investment projects. Banks will also be able 
to channel a greater portion of funds to projects where the marginal product of capital is higher 
because of banks’ increased risk-sharing expertise. 
The previous framework can be extended to incorporate international capital flows following 
Bailliu (2000). It is now assumed that foreign investors can invest in this economy through 
financial intermediaries. Allowing for international capital flows, the capital market 
equilibrium becomes: 
 𝛿∗(𝑆𝑡 + 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡) = 𝐼𝑡
∗   
FCFt represents net international capital flows and the steady-state growth rate is now given 
by: 
 𝑔𝑦
∗ =  𝛽∗𝛿∗𝑠∗ −  𝛼  
 
In the presence of international capital flows, 𝑔𝑦
∗  will be greater than 𝑔𝑦 if 𝑠
∗ is greater than 𝑠, 
all else being equal. It then follows that 𝐼𝑡
∗ will be greater than 𝐼𝑡. Capital flows must finance 
investment and not consumption and must also not crowd out locally financed investment. If 
capital flows spur investment that creates positive spill overs, the marginal productivity of 
capital will increase and β* will tend to be greater than β, all else being equal. The extent to 
which capital flows are intermediated by local financial institutions will tend to have a positive 
growth impact as the local banking sector will become more efficient. Thus, δ* will be greater 
than δ, and the marginal productivity of capital could also increase as banks would be able to 
select better investment projects (i.e. β* > β). 
The above framework has indicated that one of the channels through which private capital 
flows can impact growth is through increased local financial intermediation. However, the 
potential growth effects of private capital flows also depends on the level of financial 
development. The theoretical model of Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004) indicated that 
unrestricted financial liberalization and fully opening the economy to foreign lending might 
destabilize the economy if the domestic financial sector is not sufficiently well developed. 
Cross-border banking could have a positive influence on the banking sector of the host 
economy by increasing competition, enhancing credit growth, lowering volatility and ensuring 
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the transfer of best practices concerning supervision and regulation (Beck et al., 2014). Critics 
of cross-border banking argue that foreign banks could also have a negative influence on the 
banking sector of the host economy. Possible reasons could be because of crowding the market 
without effectively increasing competition, decreasing the system-wide outreach to lower end 
clients, increasing contagion risks and by overwhelming supervisors who do not possess the 
appropriate capacity or skills set, and so risk financial system stability (Beck et al., 2014).  
Negative consequences of large capital inflows include exchange rate appreciation, less 
competitive export sectors and thus possible reduced growth. If capital inflows occur in the 
context of a current account deficit, the real appreciation could worsen external imbalances and 
make the economy vulnerable to capital inflow reversals (Cardarelli, Elkedag, & Kose, 2009). 
Stiglitz (2000) argued that capital flight could have adverse effects on growth. Volatility is one 
observable characteristic of capital flight (Ferreira & Laux, 2009). Increasing capital flow 
volatility could result in excess exchange rate volatility that increases inflation uncertainty and 
encourages speculative financial investment by financial and real sector firms (Demir, 2009).  
According to Bailliu (2000), the theoretical models of Krugman (1998) and Corsetti, Pesenti, 
and Roubini (1998) present frameworks where policy distortions can cause large capital 
inflows being channelled to speculative investment. These frameworks highlight moral hazard 
associated with poorly regulated financial intermediaries whose liabilities are guaranteed by 
the government. These intermediaries have an incentive to engage in risky lending and finance 
speculative projects through external borrowing. If foreign creditors perceive that they will be 
bailed out by the government, domestic banks could become recipients of large capital inflows 
that will subsequently be channelled to unproductive investments (Bailliu, 2000). 
5.2.2 Review of empirical literature 
Similar to the theoretical literature, the empirical literature consists mostly of studies that 
examined the impact of cross-border banking on economic growth but there is little on the 
impact of cross-border banking volatility on economic growth. In addition, the cross-border 
banking and economic growth empirical literature has focused predominantly on cross-border 
bank lending as opposed to deposits. 
Reisen and Soto (2001) investigated the independent growth effect of different private capital 
flow types including short-term and long-term debt. Using panel data analysis covering 44 
developing countries from 1986-1997, foreign bank lending contributed to growth only if the 
banking sector was well capitalized. Durham (2003) investigated the impact of different private 
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capital flow types on growth, including other foreign investment, using data from 1977-2000. 
Other foreign investment, primarily bank lending, was found to have a negative impact on 
growth. This effect was mitigated by initial financial development. 
Empirical studies that have investigated the link between cross-border bank lending and 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa include the studies of Brambila-Macias and Massa 
(2010) and Brambila-Macias et al. (2011). Brambila-Macias and Massa (2010) employed the 
bias-corrected least-squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimator to investigate the link between 
economic growth and four distinct private capital flow types in 15 selected sub-Saharan African 
countries from 1980-2008. It was found that a 10% decrease in cross-border bank lending 
reduced economic growth by 1.5%. Brambila-Macias et al. (2011) examined the long run 
growth impact of FDI and cross-border bank lending and isolated the outcomes of four groups: 
(i) all African economies; (ii) all African economies except South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria and 
Egypt; (iii) natural resource countries; and (iv) countries that do not have a sizable hydrocarbon 
endowment. Using GMM panel data techniques, it was found that cross-border bank lending 
has a positive impact on African countries as a whole but the effect becomes negative when 
only oil countries were considered.  
Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi, and Yawson (2014) using data on 14 African countries from 1990-
2007 reported that in the absence of a well-developed financial market, private debt flows are 
likely to be misallocated and have a negative effect on growth. The negative effect was 
rationalized due to the possibility that foreign private lenders lending to African firms could be 
exposed to higher levels of information asymmetry. Using two-stage least square and system 
GMM estimation techniques for 14 sub-Saharan African countries from 1990-2013, Alley 
(2015) found that bank lending flows adversely impact the economy.  
Owen and Temesvary (2014) found that the effect of bank finance on growth and the impact 
of foreign bank involvement depended on the degree of banking sector development. In 
countries with a more developed banking sector, domestic lenders had a greater positive impact 
while the impact of foreign influence was insignificant. However, in countries with a less 
developed banking sector, the impact of foreign lenders relative to local lenders was more 
detrimental to growth. Using bank lending data from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics, 
Yoon and Kim (2015) found that foreign bank loans resulted in a higher GDP growth rate than 
expected in emerging market economies.  
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Recent contributions in the literature have investigated the effects of private capital flow shocks 
on growth. Alley (2015) found that beside bank lending flows negatively impacting on growth, 
bank lending flow shocks further weakened growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Alley and 
Poloamina (2015) evaluated the effect of shocks on the macroeconomic performance of 14 sub-
Saharan African countries from 1980-2012. It was found that shocks to gross inflows of bank 
lending per capita reduced growth. 
In summary, mixed evidence is found regarding the influence of cross-border bank lending on 
economic growth while little empirical studies have investigated the impact of cross-border 
bank lending volatility on economic growth. In addition, there is an absence of studies that 
have captured the influence of bank deposit flows on growth. This study explores the gap in 
the literature regarding the link between cross-border banking volatility (loans and deposits) 
and economic growth for sub-Saharan African countries at a macroeconomic level. 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Data 
This study follows Kleimeier et al. (2013) and defines cross-border banking as the practice 
where a bank in one country extends a loan or receives a deposit from a customer who resides 
in a different country. Therefore, the definition is based on residency, and not on the bank or 
customer’s nationality. The BIS Locational Banking Statistics cover banks’ global financial 
assets and liabilities based on the reporting entity’s residence. Locational Banking Statistics’ 
methodology is consistent with the principles used when compiling national accounts and 
balance of payments statistics (Takáds, 2010; Bruno & Shin, 2013). Consolidated Banking 
Statistics report international claims that include local claims in foreign currency which are not 
directly relevant to balance of payment financing.  
In contrast to the consolidated data sets, locational claim changes are also available in currency 
adjusted form. Following Kleimeier et al. (2013), to eliminate exchange rate valuation effects, 
the annual exchange rate adjusted stocks are calculated where the initial nominal stock (fourth 
quarter of 1995) is taken with the BIS quarterly exchange rate adjusted flows being added 
successively. Figure 5.1 depicts the time profile of cross-border bank lending and depositing 
to 41 sub-Saharan African countries from 1995-2012. Mauritius was excluded as an offshore 
banking centre. 
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Figure 5.1: Cross-border banking to sub-Saharan Africa: 1995-2012 
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics (2014) 
From Figure 5.1 it can be seen that cross-border bank lending and deposits to sub-Saharan 
Africa remained fairly constant up to the turn of the century. In 1999, US$48.18 billion was 
recorded for cross-border bank lending while US$48.38 billion was recorded for deposits. After 
decreasing from 2001-2004, cross-border bank lending has increased to US$92.68 billion by 
2012. There was a slight decrease in cross-border bank lending activity from 2008-2009. The 
increase in cross-border bank deposits during the first half of the 2000s was more pronounced, 
with US$156.70 billion recorded in 2007. From 2007-2009, a much greater decrease is 
apparent, perhaps due to the global financial crisis. However, cross-border bank deposits 
increased again to US$150.54 billion in 2012. A clear trend seen in Figure 5.1 is that deposits 
growth has outstripped that of loans in cross-border banking. 
For cross-border bank lending, the leading recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa for 2012 
were South Africa (US$26.83 billion), Liberia (US$26.08 billion), Nigeria (US$9.16 billion), 
Angola (US$9.14 billion) and Ghana (US$3.90 billion). Regarding cross-border bank deposits, 
the leading recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa for 2012 were South Africa (US$30.41 
billion), Nigeria (US$26.63 billion), Angola (US$26.15 billion), Liberia (US$13.13 billion) 
and Kenya (US$9.07 billion). 
5.3.2 Cross-border banking volatility 
This study follows the procedure in Broto, Diaz-Cassou, and Erce (2011) and Lee, Park, and 
Byun (2013) to compute cross-border banking volatility. As in Broto et al. (2011) and Lee et 
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al. (2013), the standard deviation of capital flows in a rolling window, σ it, is expressed as 
follows: 
 
𝜎𝑖𝑡 = (
1
𝑛
∑ (flow𝑖𝑘 −  μ
𝑡
𝑘=𝑡−(𝑛−1)
)²)
1
2
 (5.6) 
where μ = 1
𝑛
∑ .𝑡𝑘=𝑡−(𝑛−1) flowik, and flowik represents cross-border bank lending or cross-
border bank deposits relative to GDP respectively for country i in period k. 
This study follows Lee et al. (2013) and first normalizes the size of the flows in each of the 
rolling windows. Because the standard deviation indicates dispersion from the mean, greater 
cross-border banking flows (and hence greater means) might well exaggerate the volatility size 
over time if not normalized. Figure 5.2 shows the time profile of the volatility of cross-border 
banking from 1996 to 2011. The first three-year rolling window is from 1995-1997 and the 
midpoint, i.e. 1996, is then the first volatility measure. 
 
Figure 5.2: Volatility of cross-border banking to sub-Saharan Africa: 1996-2011 
Source: Calculated from BIS Locational Banking Statistics (2014) 
Note:  The scale of the vertical axis is the calculated volatilities computed as the standard 
deviation of cross-border banking flows in three-year overlapping rolling windows with 
capital flow sizes first normalized. 
 
Figure 5.2 indicates that the average volatility of cross-border bank lending has been 
continuously higher than the average volatility of deposits. The average volatility of cross-
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border bank lending has rarely been stable at the aggregate level. Cross-border bank lending 
volatility peaked during 2008, possibly as a result of the global financial crisis. For cross-border 
bank deposits, volatility on average has increased more steadily compared to lending since 
2000. From 2009-2011, a less stable trend is evident. For the full period, average cross-border 
bank lending volatility ranged from a low of 7.9 in South Africa to 38.9 in Comoros. Average 
cross-border bank deposit volatility ranged from a low of 5.5 in Kenya to 35.3 in Lesotho. 
5.3.3 Empirical model 
To estimate the effect of cross-border banking and cross-border banking volatility on economic 
growth, this study uses a modified version of the model used by Brambila-Macias et al. (2011) 
and Agbloyor et al. (2014). The following dynamic model is specified: 
 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡
′
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(5.7) 
Xit represents a vector of control variables as standard determinants of economic growth: 
inflation, trade openness, gross capital formation, private sector credit and institutional quality. 
The variables are defined as follows: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  = GDP (constant 2005 US$) (log) of country i at year t. 
𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡  = Either cross-border bank lending/GDP or cross-border bank deposits/GDP 
of country i at year t. 
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡  = Volatility of cross-border lending/volatility of cross-border deposits 
measured as the standard deviation of cross-border lending or cross-border deposits/GDP in 
three-year overlapping rolling windows of country i at year t. 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡  = Consumer price index (log) (2010=100) of country i at year t. 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡  = Trade/GDP of country i at year t. 
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 = Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic 
investment)/GDP of country i at year t. 
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐸 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  = Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions/GDP of country i at year t. 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿 𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 = Institutional quality of country i at year t. 
A further description of the variables and their data sources appear in Appendix 5.A. 
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Theoretical underpinning 
The empirical model is motivated by justifying the choice of the explanatory variables. Both 
cross-border banking (loans or deposits) and cross-border banking volatility is included in the 
same empirical model as the variables could impact differently on economic growth. 
Private capital flows can positively impact growth by increasing the domestic investment rate, 
through spurring investment associated with positive spill overs, and by leading to increased 
domestic financial intermediation (Bailliu, 2000). However, capital flows must finance 
investment and not consumption or speculative investment while also not crowding out locally 
financed investment. Empirically, Brambila-Macias et al. (2011) found that cross-border bank 
lending positively impacted on growth for African countries, while Alley (2015) found that 
bank lending reduced growth in sub-Saharan Africa. The link between cross-border banking 
and economic growth is, therefore, a priori unclear. 
Increasing capital flow volatility could result in excess exchange rate volatility that increases 
inflation uncertainty and encourages speculative financial investment by financial and real 
sector firms (Demir, 2009). Empirically, Alley and Poloamina (2015) found that shocks to bank 
lending reduced growth in sub-Saharan Africa. This study, therefore, expects a negative 
relationship between cross-border banking volatility and economic growth.  
High inflation would impact adversely on economic growth by creating distortions such as an 
increase in volatility and uncertainty that would result in a shift to less productive activities 
(Bittencourt, 2012). Therefore, a negative relationship between inflation and economic growth 
is expected. 
Endogenous growth theories do not necessarily predict that trade openness would lead to higher 
economic growth for all countries under all circumstances (Eris & Ulasan, 2013). Empirically, 
Brambila-Macias et al. (2011) reported that trade openness was an important driver of 
economic growth in Africa, while Ahmed (2013) found that trade openness negatively 
contributed to economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. The link between trade openness and 
economic growth is, therefore, a priori unclear. 
Adams (2009) found a significant positive link between gross domestic investment and 
economic growth in sub-Saharan African countries, and a positive relationship with growth is 
a priori also expected. 
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The domestic financial system could positively impact economic growth through increasing 
the productivity of capital, the saving rate and the proportion of savings channelled to 
investment (Aziakpono, 2011). However, empirical evidence regarding the impact of financial 
development on economic growth remains mostly inconclusive (Aziakpono, 2011; Anderson, 
Jones, & Tarp, 2012). Results from Agbloyor et al. (2014) suggest that financial development 
spurs economic growth in Africa, while Menyah, Nazlioglu, and Wolde-Rufael (2014) rejected 
the finance-led growth hypothesis for the overwhelming number of sub-Saharan African 
countries in their sample. The link between private sector credit and economic growth is, 
therefore, a priori unclear. 
Agbloyor et al. (2014) indicated that institutions positively impact economic growth in Africa 
and a positive link with growth a priori is similarly expected. Following Agbloyor et al. (2014), 
the civil liberties index from Freedom House is used as an institutional quality indicator. The 
sub-categories of the index permit freedom of expression and belief, associational and 
organisational rights, and the rule of law, as well as personal autonomy and individual rights. 
Because the index ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the highest civil liberties, a negative 
relation between the index and economic growth has to be hypothesized.  
5.3.4 Estimation technique 
Capital, such as bank flows, is likely to flow to countries experiencing high growth rates 
(Kleimeier & Versteeg, 2010). To take into consideration the possible endogeneity of th e 
explanatory variables, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique 
employing the Arellano and Bover (1995) method covering the period 2000-2011 is employed. 
This method is suitable for panels with gaps, a feature of most sub-Saharan African panel sets. 
Sample countries are provided in Appendix 5.B. 
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5.4 Results and discussion 
 
Table 5.1: Cross-border banking, cross-border banking volatility and economic growth: 
system GMM estimation 
    
    
 (1) 
 
(2)  
Lag of dependent variable (log) 
Cross-border - loans 
1.012***(0.004) 
0.001(0.001) 
1.009***(0.005) 
n/a 
 
Cross-border volatility - loans 0.001(0.001) n/a  
Cross-border - deposits n/a 0.002***(0.001)  
Cross-border volatility - deposits 
CPI (log) 
Trade openness 
Gross capital formation 
Private sector credit 
Institutional quality 
 
n/a 
-0.047**(0.019) 
-0.001***(0.001) 
0.001***(0.001) 
-0.001(0.001) 
-0.007**(0.004) 
 
0.001(0.001) 
-0.030(0.025) 
-0.001***(0.001) 
0.001***(0.001) 
-0.001(0.001) 
-0.008**(0.003) 
 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.713 
0.201 
 
0.303 
0.171 
 
Observations      383      383  
Countries      39      39  
    
Note:  The dependent variable is GDP (constant 2005 US$) (log).  
Model 1 presents the impact of cross-border bank lending and its volatility on economic 
growth.  
Model 2 presents the impact of cross-border bank deposits and its volatility on 
economic growth.  
***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 5.1 presents the main results. The lagged values of the dependent variables for both 
models are statistically significant, indicating a high level of persistency in economic growth. 
In this study, it had been hypothesized that cross-border banking volatility will negatively 
impact economic growth. No evidence is found that either cross-border bank lending volatility 
or cross-border bank deposit volatility influence economic growth. With banking sector 
development in sub-Saharan Africa relatively shallow, it would appear that shocks to cross-
border banking flows are not transmitted to the real economy through financial intermediation. 
The private sector credit coefficients are insignificant in both models. 
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Contrary to the findings of Brambila-Macias et al. (2011) and Alley (2015), no relationship is 
found between cross-border bank lending and economic growth. However, a positive link 
between cross-border bank deposits and economic growth is found. Deposits are largely 
customer-driven, and banks have little incentive to reject deposits whereas information 
asymmetries may impact on the supply of cross-border bank loans (Kleimeier et al., 2013). 
Inflation, as a proxy for macroeconomic instability, is negatively related to economic growth 
as expected in Model 1. Greater macroeconomic instability is therefore negatively associated 
with economic growth. Trade openness is found to be negatively related to economic growth. 
This is in line with Ahmed (2013) who found that trade openness negatively contributed to 
economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa. This finding also supports previous literature that 
developing countries may benefit from trade restrictions under certain conditions (Yanikkaya, 
2003). 
As expected, gross capital formation is significantly positively related to economic growth. 
Adams (2009) also found a significant positive link between gross domestic investment and 
economic growth in sub-Saharan African countries. The results also suggest that institutions 
positively impact on economic growth. The negative relation suggests that countries with 
stronger institutions (and lower index values) experience higher economic growth. Agbloyor 
et al. (2014) also provided evidence that institutions play a positive rolling in spurring 
economic growth in Africa. 
The post-estimation diagnostics are as expected in all models, with the Sargan test of over-
identification failing to reject the null hypothesis that the over-identification restrictions are 
valid. Regarding the Arellano and Bond GMM procedure that tests for the first order and 
second order serial correlation in the disturbances, the null hypothesis of the absence of first 
order serial correlation should be rejected, while one should not reject the absence of second 
order serial correlation (Baltagi, Demetriades, & Law, 2009). 
5.4.1 Cross-border banking volatility and economic growth in resource-rich developing 
countries (RRDCs) 
RRDCs such as Angola, Liberia, and Nigeria have become some of the main cross-border 
banking recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa. While Brambila-Macias et al. (2011) found 
that cross-border bank lending positively impacted on economic growth in Africa, the effect 
became negative when their sample was restricted to oil countries. This study, therefore, re-
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estimates the models by limiting the samples to RRDCs. Following IMF (2012), RRDCs were 
selected based on the following criteria: 
- Using 2010 GNI per capita, the countries must be either classified as low- or lower-middle-
income countries; and 
- Using average data from 2006-2010, at least 20% of total exports were natural resources. 
Alternatively, the countries derived at least 20% of their revenue from natural resources. 
Sample countries are provided in Appendix 5.B. 
Table 5.2: Cross-border banking, cross-border banking volatility and economic growth in 
RRDCs: system GMM estimation 
    
    
 (1) (2)  
Lag of dependent variable (log) 
Cross-border - loans 
1.030***(0.010) 
0.002(0.001) 
1.079***(0.031) 
n/a 
 
Cross-border volatility - loans -0.001(0.001) n/a  
Cross-border - deposits n/a 0.008**(0.004)  
Cross-border volatility - deposits 
CPI (log) 
Trade openness 
Gross capital formation 
Private sector credit 
Institutional quality 
 
n/a 
0.005(0.009) 
-0.001(0.001) 
0.002**(0.001) 
-0.004***(0.001) 
-0.021***(0.007) 
 
-0.003*(0.002) 
0.048(0.035) 
0.001(0.001) 
0.003***(0.001) 
-0.008**(0.004) 
-0.034***(0.013) 
 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.919 
0.107 
 
0.857 
0.137 
 
Observations      141      141  
Countries      15      15  
    
Note:  The dependent variable is GDP (constant 2005 US$) (log).  
Model 1 presents the impact of cross-border bank lending and its volatility on economic 
growth.  
Model 2 presents the impact of cross-border bank deposits and its volatility on 
economic growth.  
***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 5.2 presents the results for RRDCs. The lagged values of the dependent variables for 
both models are statistically significant, indicating a high level of persistency in economic 
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growth. Similar to the main results, no link is found between cross-border bank lending 
volatility and economic growth in RRDCs. This is contrary to the findings of Brambila-Macias 
et al. (2011) who reported a negative relationship between cross-border bank lending and 
growth when their sample was restricted to oil countries. However, evidence is found of a 
statistically significant and negative relationship between cross-border bank deposit volatility 
and economic growth for RRDCs. The negative effect of cross-border bank deposit volatility 
on growth could be due to the notion that increased bank deposit flow volatility increases 
uncertainty that encourages speculative financial investment and in turn adversely affects 
economic growth. Also similar to the main results, this study found a positive link between 
cross-border bank deposits and economic growth for RRDCs.  
Gross capital formation is significantly positively related to economic growth in RRDCs, 
similar to the results reported previously. The results for RRDCs do not support the finance-
led growth hypothesis. Brambila-Macias et al. (2011) posited that because of the resource 
curse, oil producer countries have less incentive to invest in financial sector reforms than non-
oil countries. Similar to the main results, the importance of institutions in spurring economic 
growth in RRDCs is confirmed. 
The post-estimation diagnostics are as expected in both RRDC models. The Sargan test of over-
identification fails to reject the null hypothesis that the over-identification restrictions are valid. 
The null hypothesis of the absence of first order serial correlation in the disturbances is rejected, 
while the absence of second order serial correlation in the disturbances is not rejected (Baltagi 
et al., 2009). 
5.4.2 Robustness 
Finally, to check the robustness of the results, this study re-estimated the models in two 
variations. The first variation has cross-border banking (loans or deposits) as one of the 
explanatory variables, and there is no cross-border banking volatility. The second variation has 
cross-border banking volatility as one of the explanatory variables, but does not have the cross-
border banking variable. The results are reported in Appendix 5.C do not differ from the main 
results. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This study provides evidence that cross-border bank deposit flows contribute to economic 
growth in sub-Saharan Africa. Cross-border banking volatility, specifically cross-border bank 
deposit volatility, is detrimental to economic growth when the sample is restricted to RRDCs. 
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No evidence is found that cross-border bank lending is related to economic growth. The results, 
therefore, indicate that cross-border bank loans and deposits require a differentiated analysis. 
A policy implication regarding the negative link between cross-border bank deposit volatility 
and economic growth is that RRDCs should have measures in place to monitor the 
predictability of deposit flows. This is important as the negative effects of deposit shocks could 
minimize the growth-enhancing benefits of bank deposits received. 
Only 24% of African countries have explicit deposit insurance (Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, & 
Laeven, 2014). Financial sector policymakers should investigate the feasibility of developing 
the region’s deposit insurance to prevent bank runs associated with the volatility of cross-
border banking deposits. 
As opposed to other private capital flows, cross-border banking has only recently attracted 
attention in the empirical literature. Using a differentiated approach to investigate the 
determinants of cross-border bank lending and deposits to sub-Saharan African countries is a 
further future research avenue. A differentiated approach to examine the determinants of cross-
border bank lending volatility and deposit volatility of sub-Saharan African countries is also 
advocated. 
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Appendix 5.A: Variables and data sources 
 
GDP: GDP (log) in constant 2005 US$ obtained from the World Bank WDI. 
Cross-border banking: Either cross-border lending/GDP or cross-border bank deposits/GDP. 
This study follows Kleimeier et al. (2013) and defines cross-border banking as the practice 
where a bank in one country extends a loan or receives a deposit from a customer who resides 
in a different country. Data is obtained from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics. 
Volatility of cross-border banking: Standard deviation of cross-border banking (lending or 
deposits)/GDP using three-year overlapping rolling windows with the method described in 
section 5.3.2. 
Inflation: Consumer price index (log) (2010=100) reflects changes in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. The series is obtained from the World 
Bank WDI. 
Trade openness: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP 
with the series obtained from the World Bank WDI. 
Gross capital formation: Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) as a 
share of GDP consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net 
changes in the level of inventories. The series is obtained from the World Bank WDI. 
Private sector credit: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to 
GDP (%) with the series obtained from the World Bank Global Financial Development 
database. 
Institutional quality: The civil liberties index from Freedom House is used as institutional 
quality indicator. The sub-categories of the index permit for freedoms of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual 
rights. The index ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the highest institutional quality. 
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Appendix 5.B: Sample countries 
 
Full sample countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia. 
Resource-rich developing countries (RRDCs): Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, 
Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Zambia. 
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Appendix 5.C: Robustness 
Table 5.3: Cross-border banking, cross-border banking volatility and economic growth: 
system GMM estimation 
    
    
 (1) 
 
(2)  
Lag of dependent variable (log) 
Cross-border - loans 
1.012***(0.004) 
0.001(0.001) 
1.012***(0.004) 
n/a 
 
Cross-border volatility - loans               n/a 0.001(0.001)  
Cross-border - deposits n/a                 n/a  
Cross-border volatility - deposits 
CPI (log) 
Trade openness 
Gross capital formation 
Private sector credit 
Institutional quality 
 
n/a 
-0.047**(0.019) 
-0.001***(0.001) 
0.001**(0.001) 
-0.001(0.001) 
-0.007**(0.004) 
 
                n/a 
-0.047**(0.019) 
-0.001**(0.001) 
0.001**(0.001) 
-0.001(0.001) 
-0.007**(0.004) 
 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.724 
0.198 
 
0.706 
0.202 
 
Observations      383      383  
Countries      39      39  
    
Note:  The dependent variable is GDP (constant 2005 US$) (log).  
***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5.4: Cross-border banking, cross-border banking volatility and economic growth: 
system GMM estimation 
    
    
 (1) 
 
(2)  
Lag of dependent variable (log) 
Cross-border - loans 
1.012***(0.004) 
              n/a 
1.009***(0.005) 
n/a 
 
Cross-border volatility - loans               n/a                 n/a  
Cross-border - deposits 0.002***(0.001)                 n/a  
Cross-border volatility - deposits 
CPI (log) 
Trade openness 
Gross capital formation 
Private sector credit 
Institutional quality 
 
n/a 
-0.046**(0.019) 
-0.001***(0.001) 
0.001***(0.001) 
-0.001(0.001) 
-0.007**(0.007) 
 
  0.001(0.001) 
-0.030(0.024) 
-0.001***(0.001) 
0.001***(0.001) 
-0.001(0.001) 
-0.007**(0.003) 
 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.734 
0.194 
 
0.280 
0.174 
 
Observations      383      383  
Countries      39      39  
    
Note:  The dependent variable is GDP (constant 2005 US$) (log).  
***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5.5: Cross-border banking, cross-border banking volatility and economic growth in 
RRDCs: system GMM estimation 
    
    
 (1) 
 
(2)  
Lag of dependent variable (log) 
Cross-border - loans 
1.030***(0.010) 
0.002(0.001) 
1.005***(0.008) 
n/a 
 
Cross-border volatility - loans               n/a -0.001(0.001)  
Cross-border - deposits n/a                 n/a  
Cross-border volatility - deposits 
CPI (log) 
Trade openness 
Gross capital formation 
Private sector credit 
Institutional quality 
 
n/a 
0.004(0.004) 
-0.001(0.001) 
0.002***(0.001) 
-0.004***(0.001) 
-0.021***(0.007) 
 
                n/a 
-0.009(0.019) 
-0.001(0.001) 
0.001(0.001) 
-0.002(0.001) 
-0.013**(0.006) 
 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.921 
0.107 
 
0.996 
0.168 
 
Observations      141      141  
Countries      15      15  
    
Note:  The dependent variable is GDP (constant 2005 US$) (log).  
***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5.6: Cross-border banking, cross-border banking volatility and economic growth in 
RRDCs: system GMM estimation 
    
    
 (1) 
 
(2)  
Lag of dependent variable (log) 
Cross-border - loans 
1.064***(0.032) 
              n/a 
1.095***(0.032) 
n/a 
 
Cross-border volatility - loans               n/a                 n/a  
Cross-border - deposits 0.007**(0.004)                 n/a  
Cross-border volatility - deposits 
CPI (log) 
Trade openness 
Gross capital formation 
Private sector credit 
Institutional quality 
 
n/a 
0.032**(0.034) 
-0.001(0.001) 
0.002**(0.001) 
-0.008*(0.001) 
-0.035**(0.007) 
 
  -0.003**(0.002) 
0.048(0.032) 
0.001**(0.001) 
0.002***(0.001) 
-0.008**(0.001) 
-0.042**(0.006) 
 
 
Sargan test for over-identifying restriction: 
p-value 
2nd order autocorrelation: p-value 
 
0.996 
0.093 
 
0.922 
0.095 
 
Observations      141      141  
Countries      15      15  
    
Note:  The dependent variable is GDP (constant 2005 US$) (log).  
***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FINANCIAL OPENNESS AND OUTPUT VOLATILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the effect of financial openness on output volatility in African countries. 
Output volatility has been much higher in developing countries than in their developed 
counterparts (Perry, 2009; Essers, 2013). For many developing countries and regions such as 
sub-Saharan Africa, output volatility remains a critical topic and appears to be widespread 
(Malik & Temple, 2009). Negative consequences of higher output volatility identified in the 
literature include lower economic growth (Ramey & Ramey, 1995; Kose, Prasad, & Terrones, 
2006), lower private investment (Aizenman & Marion, 1999), higher consumption volatility 
(Loayza, Rancière, Servén, & Ventura, 2007; Perry, 2009), a higher degree of income 
inequality (Breen & Garcia-Penalosa, 2005) and substantial costs relating to employment 
(Benigno & Ricci, 2011).  
In recent years, economic research has started to focus on the implication of financial openness 
on output volatility (Popov, 2011). The sparse literature on the effects of financial openness on 
output volatility warrants more empirical research (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, & Wei, 2009). There 
is still no consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature whether financial openness 
increases or reduces output volatility (Hwang, Park, & Shin, 2013; Meller, 2013). While trade 
openness has been promoted as being constructive for economic performance, there remains 
much controversy regarding the benefits of financial openness1 (Ferreiro, Correa, & Gomez, 
2009; Aizenman, Jinjarak, & Park, 2013). 
At a conceptual level, financial openness involves benefits as well as costs, and on the positive 
side can contribute to economic growth through promoting capital accumulation and 
technology spill overs (Hwang et al., 2013). Countries could also smooth their consumption 
and engage in risk sharing, while collateral benefits include financial sector development and 
improvement in the quality of institutions and governance. However, financial openness limits 
monetary policy independence and potentially causes economic volatility (Hwang et al., 2013). 
                                                          
1 As explained by Gehringer (2013), this study is part of the majority of studies from the economic community 
that clearly differentiates between financial liberalization and financial development, and in the present study the 
concepts of financial liberalization, financial integration and financial openness are used as synonyms. 
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Specifically, by possibly inducing more volatile capital flows and volatile interest rates, a 
potential cost of financial openness is exposure to crises and external shocks. 
In this study, the investigation is limited to one potential cost of financial openness: output 
volatility. Sub-Saharan African studies that have examined the financial openness and output 
volatility link include the work of Ahmed and Suardi (2009). This study differs from Ahmed 
and Suardi (2009) in that this study specifically investigates how financial openness impacts 
on output volatility through the channel of volatile FDI flows. Very little attention has been 
directed to investigate the link between capital inflow volatility and output volatility (Federico, 
Vegh, & Vuletin, 2013). 
According to Hwang et al. (2013) the literature has identified three main channels through 
which financial openness impacts output volatility: volatile capital flows, volatile real interest 
rates, and through financial and economic crises. This study focuses on the volatile capital flow 
channel, specifically the impact of FDI volatility. Because of sub-Saharan Africa’s low savings 
and investment rates, FDI as a source of capital is extremely important compared to other 
capital flows (Agbloyor, Abor, Adjasi, & Yawson, 2013). Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2010) 
found that different types of external financing had different effects on output volatility. It is 
also widely perceived that certain types of capital flows are more desired than others 
(Aizenman et al., 2013). FDI is often regarded as more stable than other flows and should thus 
be encouraged to guarantee a less volatile level of output (Federico et al., 2013), while foreign 
debt has been blamed for increasing the risk of financial crises (Bordo, Meissner, & Stuckler, 
2010). Countries seeking to liberalize capital flows should start with FDI inflows (IMF, 2012). 
Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine whether FDI inflow volatility has an effect on 
output volatility as well. 
This study uses panel data from 34 sub-Saharan African countries from 1990 to 2011 to 
estimate the models. Output volatility could exhibit cross-section dependence through regional 
and macroeconomic linkages that arise from common global shocks (e.g. global financial 
crisis), shared institutions (e.g. the IMF), or from country or regional local spill overs. Standard 
panel estimation techniques do not necessarily produce consistent parameter estimates when 
the errors from a panel regression exhibit cross-section dependence (Kapetanios, Pesaran, & 
Yamagata, 2011). The models are estimated using the Augmented Mean Group (AMG) 
estimator of Eberhardt and Teal (2010) to account for cross-section dependence. 
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 provides an overview of the 
relevant literature, Section 6.3 details the methodology employed in the empirical analysis, in 
Section 6.4 the results of the empirical estimations are presented and in Section 6.5 the chapter 
is concluded. 
6.2 Overview of the relevant literature 
The theoretical literature suggests that the link between financial openness and output volatility 
is a priori unclear (Hwang et al., 2013; Meller, 2013). Increasing financial openness could 
reduce macroeconomic volatility in capital-poor developing economies by providing additional 
sources of external finance (Kose et al., 2006). Developing economies would then be able to 
diversify away from limited production bases that are often agricultural or natural resource 
dependent, thus lowering output volatility (Kose et al., 2009). Increased financial openness 
may also promote institutional reforms leading to a stable financial system, thereby 
contributing to output stability (Mishkin, 2009). 
Financial openness could also increase output volatility. Increased capital market integration 
could result in increased specialization (Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, & Yosha, 2003). At a more 
advanced stage of development, middle-income countries could subsequently become more 
vulnerable to industry-specific shocks resulting in higher output volatility (Kose et al., 2009). 
If increasing capital market integration results in an over-reliance on external debt, countries 
will be exposed to world interest rate shocks and thus higher output volatility (Kose et al., 
2009). Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004) introduced a framework to analyse how 
financial factors could lead to instability in small open economies. In an economy with a closed 
capital account, the response to a cash flow shock is limited given the constrained amount of 
capital available to finance entrepreneurs. Extra funding sources in an open economy could 
potentially increase the response to a shock and the potential for volatility. Aghion et al. (2004) 
conclude that unrestricted financial liberalization could be destabilizing for countries without 
a well-developed financial sector. 
According to Hwang et al. (2013), the literature has identified volatile capital flows as one of 
the main channels through which financial openness impacts output volatility. Stiglitz (2000) 
already noted that the potential benefits of financial openness may be offset by capital 
movements that are highly pro-cyclical, thus exacerbating economic fluctuations. Kim and 
Singal (2000) stated that a major concern is movements due to “hot money,” i.e. flows that are 
highly sensitive to differences in interest rates, economic growth expectations, and expected 
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securities’ returns. A small shock to the economy may induce volatile flows that can aggravate 
the shock and destabilize the domestic economy. Nevertheless, very little attention has been 
given to investigate the relationship between capital inflow volatility and outflow volatility 
(Federico et al., 2013). 
Converse (2014) built a model of a small open economy where, because of financial 
constraints, firms that funded long-term projects with short-term debt, i.e. maturity mismatch, 
are prevalent. If there is uncertainty about the future availability of foreign borrowing, firms 
will cut long-term investment resulting in decreasing aggregate investment that would generate 
a decline in aggregate productivity. Capital flow volatility shocks thus amplify volatility in 
output and total factor productivity in economies where maturity mismatch is widespread, as 
in the case of emerging market economies (Converse, 2014). 
Within the empirical literature, there is no consensus whether financial openness increases or 
decreases output volatility (Meller, 2013). A positive link between financial openness and 
output volatility has been reported in the literature. Hwang et al. (2013) used data from 21 
advanced and 81 developing countries from 1971-2010 and reported that financial openness 
increased output volatility in developing countries. Hwang et al. (2013) further examined the 
main channels through which financial openness influences output volatility in developing 
countries. Their results showed that financial openness increases output volatility through a 
crisis episode, specifically currency and external debt crises. Another channel, volatile capital 
flows, did not significantly influence output volatility. Hwang et al. (2013) did not differentiate 
between different types of private capital flows: this could perhaps explain their non-significant 
finding. Aizenman et al. (2010) found that different types of private capital flows have different 
impacts on output volatility.  
It was also argued that the indirect effects of financial openness (e.g. on financial development 
or institutions) might be far more important. Alternatively, a relationship does exist, but the 
link is non-linear or depends on some omitted variable (Meller, 2013). Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad (2006) found no evidence of increased output volatility after equity market 
liberalization. However, their results suggest that in economically fragile countries 
characterized by low-quality institutions and a poorly developed financial system, equity 
market liberalization may increase output volatility. Investigating 25 sub-Saharan African 
countries from 1971-2005, Ahmed and Suardi (2009) reported that financial market depth and 
institutional quality operated jointly with trade- and financial openness to reduce output 
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volatility. Aizenman et al. (2010) investigated the impact of the trilemma policy mix on the 
economic performance in developing countries. Their results indicated that increased financial 
openness, when supported by a high degree of financial development, reduce output volatility.  
Some studies have found no link between financial openness and output volatility. Razin and 
Rose (1992) reported no significant relationship between financial openness and output 
volatility for 138 countries from 1950-1988. Being unable to distinguish between global or 
idiosyncratic, and temporary or persistent, shocks was put forward as explanation for their 
finding. Using data for 24 OECD countries from 1960-2000, Buch, Doepke, and Pierdzioch 
(2005) found no stable relationship between financial openness and output volatility. Their 
results suggest that the link between macroeconomic policy, financial openness, and output 
volatility has changed over the years. Kose et al. (2009) summarized that existing research 
using different regression models, country samples, and time periods lead to the conclusion 
that no systematic link between financial openness and output volatility exists. 
6.3 Methodology 
6.3.1 Data 
Various measures of formal-political (de jure) and actual (de facto) financial openness have 
been employed in the related literature. Gehringer (2013) notes that it has become common 
practice for most of the recent contributions to the field to distinguish between de jure and de 
facto indicators. De jure indicators are concerned with the presence or not of legal restrictions 
on capital transactions, while de facto indicators measure flows or stocks of foreign assets 
and/or liabilities. Therefore, it is not certain that a formal financially open economy is 
practically so and vice versa (Gehringer, 2013).  
This study employs a de facto financial openness indicator. Although both de jure and de facto 
indicators contain valuable information, de facto indicators could provide a clearer picture of 
an economy’s financial integration and in many empirical cases is more suitable (Kose et al., 
2009). Financial liberalization remains an incomplete and ongoing process in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Misati & Nyamongo, 2012; Ahmed, 2013) and, therefore, materializes gradually. 
Further, de jure indicators being categorical variables are often time-invariant. 
As indicator of de facto financial openness, this study uses the “External Wealth of Nations 
Mark II” database (updated) of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) that measures the stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities. The use of stock figures is preferable to the use of flow data as 
annual gross flows are volatile and open to measurement error, while for risk-sharing purposes 
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stock measures are also more suitable (Kose et al., 2009). Other financial openness studies that 
have employed this database include Hwang et al. (2013) and Popov (2011). Following Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), the de facto financial openness indicator was calculated using the 
ratio of 
(𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡)
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
 with FA (FL) denoting the stock of external assets (liabilities): Figure 6.1 
plots this ratio for sub-Saharan African countries over 1990-2011. 
 
Figure 6.1: Ratio of sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities to GDP for sub-Saharan 
Africa, 1990-2011 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database (2007) (updated) 
Note:  The scale of the vertical axis is the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) calculated de facto 
financial openness indicator using the ratio of 
(𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡)
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
 with FA (FL) denoting the 
stock of external assets (liabilities). 
 
From Figure 6.1 it can be seen that when Mauritius, as an offshore banking centre, is excluded 
from the analysis the degree of financial openness in sub-Saharan Africa since 1990 has been 
disappointing. As of 2011, the ratio is even lower than 150% which was the approximate ratio 
in 1990. After the ratio remained fairly stable from 1998-2004, a gradual decrease is apparent. 
Excluding Mauritius, the five highest recorded ratios as of 2011 were in Liberia (435%), 
Seychelles (419%), Sao Tome and Principe (251%), Lesotho (226%) and Mauritania (208%). 
The lowest recorded ratios as of 2011 were in Cameroon (51%), Ethiopia (53%), Malawi 
(54%), CAR (70%) and Rwanda (72%). 
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To calculate output volatility, this study follows Jetter (2014) and uses the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter to detrend annual country growth rates. Backus and Kehoe (1992) suggest that for 
annual data the benchmark value of λHP = 100 should be applied to adjust for the sensitivity of 
the trend portion. After applying the HP filter, an annual cycle term is obtained for each 
country. As output volatility, in general, is the concern, and not just positive or negative 
deviations from the trend, this study follows Jetter (2014) and squares the cycle term to obtain 
a measurement for the annual volatility component of a country’s growth rate. This value is 
subsequently divided by 100 to facilitate comparability. 
 
Figure 6.2: Output volatility for sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2011 
Source: Calculated from WDI (2016) 
Note:  The scale of the vertical axis is the calculated output volatility. The HP filter is used to 
obtain an annual cycle term that is squared and divided by 100 to facilitate 
comparability. 
 
From Figure 6.2 it can be seen that for the period under review average output volatility for 45 
sub-Saharan African countries peaked during 1997. Since 2005, lower average values 
compared to the average values of 1990-2011 have been recorded. For the whole period under 
review, Liberia (6.427), Rwanda (1.842), Mauritania (0.784), Chad (0.668) and Angola (0.561) 
had the highest average output volatility. The lowest average output volatility was recorded in 
Guinea (0.014), Tanzania (0.016), Ghana (0.023), Lesotho (0.026) and Mauritius (0.027). 
Figure 6.3 shows preliminary evidence regarding the link between financial openness and 
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output volatility that suggests increased financial openness is associated with higher output 
volatility. 
 
Figure 6.3: Scatterplot of average output volatility and average financial openness 
Source: Calculated from WDI (2016) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti database (2007) (updated) 
Note:  The scale of the vertical axis is the calculated output volatility. The HP filter is used to 
obtain an annual cycle term that is squared and divided by 100 to facilitate 
comparability. The scale of the horizontal axis is the calculated de facto financial 
openness indicator using the ratio of 
(𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡)
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
 with FA (FL) denoting the stock of 
external assets (liabilities). 
 
The focus in this chapter is also on whether financial openness impact output volatility through 
the channel of volatile capital flows, specifically FDI volatility. The focus is on net FDI flows 
while acknowledging that this focus reflects the joint behaviour of foreign and domestic agents 
that could have different motivations and incentives. The focus is largely driven by the 
availability of data. To compute volatility, this study calculates the standard deviation of FDI 
flows using three-year overlapping rolling windows. Following Broto, Diaz-Cassou, and Erce 
(2011) and Lee, Park, and Byun (2013) the standard deviation of FDI flows in a rolling window, 
σit, is expressed as follows: 
 
𝜎𝑖𝑡 = (
1
𝑛
∑ (flow𝑖𝑘 −  μ
𝑡
𝑘=𝑡−(𝑛−1)
)²)
1
2
 (6.1) 
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where μ = 1
𝑛
∑ .𝑡𝑘=𝑡−(𝑛−1) flowik, and flowik represents the FDI flows relative to GDP for country 
i in period k. 
An increase in FDI flows would inflate the volatility size over time because the standard 
deviation indicates dispersion from the mean. Therefore, this study follows Lee et al. (2013) 
and first normalizes the size of the FDI flows in each of the rolling windows. 
6.3.2 Model specification 
Following the model adapted from Coric and Pugh (2013) the empirical model is specified as: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽5𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑉𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽9𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(2) 
 
With the variables defined as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡= Output volatility using the HP filter with λHP = 100 for detrending growth rates of country 
i at year t. 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡= De facto financial openness indicator, i.e. stocks of foreign assets and 
liabilities/GDP of country i at year t. 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡= Volatility of FDI flows measured as the standard deviation of capital inflows in 
three-year overlapping rolling windows of FDI inflows/GDP of country i at year t. 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡= Consumer price index (log) (2010=100) of country i at year t. 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡= Government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) of country i at year t. 
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡= Terms of trade volatility measured as the standard deviation of terms of trade 
index (2000=100) of country i at year t. 
𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡= Trade/GDP of country i at year t. 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡= GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) of country i at year t. 
𝑃𝑉𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡= Private credit by deposit money bank other financial institutions/GDP of country i at 
year t. 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡= Political rights of country i at year t. 
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A further description of the variables and their data sources appear in Appendix 6.A. 
Following Adjasi, Abor, Osei, and Nyavor-Foli (2012), who argue that the effect of FDI on 
output depends on the local financial market, this study also estimates a second equation to 
capture the effect of the interaction of FDI volatility and financial openness on output volatility:  
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽8𝑃𝑉𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(6.3) 
 
where β2, in this instance, represents the interactive effect between FDI volatility and financial 
openness. 
6.3.3 Theoretical underpinning of the model 
The theoretical literature suggests that the link between financial openness and output volatility 
is a priori unclear. Within the empirical literature, there is also no consensus on whether 
financial openness increases or decreases output volatility (Meller, 2013). The a priori 
expectation for the expected coefficient for financial openness can, therefore, be either positive 
or negative.  
The logarithm of the CPI index is used to capture the effect of inflation on output volatility. 
Summers (2005) argues that through achieving low and stable inflation, monetary policy could 
contribute to an environment conducive to more stable output growth. This can be achieved 
through lower inflation that reduces nominal distortions (e.g. from taxation), thereby 
eliminating a source of uncertainty regarding firms’ investment decisions. Policy makers might 
thus have more flexibility in using monetary policy to respond to a crisis. Therefore, a positive 
coefficient is hypothesized for inflation. According to Meller (2013), high government 
expenditures could be a sign of macroeconomic imbalances signifying poor fiscal policy and 
increasing output volatility. A positive coefficient for government final consumption 
expenditure is therefore expected. 
Supply-side shocks are proxied by the standard deviation of the terms of trade index. According 
to Malik and Temple (2009), it is well known that a positive link exists between output 
volatility and terms of trade volatility. Terms of trade volatility are also strongly associated 
with a lack of export diversification, and countries that specialize in a narrow range of exports 
are vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices. A positive coefficient for terms of trade volatility 
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is therefore expected. Trade openness’ effect on output volatility is controversial (Meller, 
2013). Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) found that sectors more open to trade are more 
volatile and that more trade results in increased specialization. Together, these forces imply 
increased output volatility. Cavallo (2008) provided evidence of a negative relationship 
between trade openness and output volatility. It was further stated that this result is consistent 
with the financial fragility literature where trade openness reduces vulnerability to certain 
forms of financial crises and smooths the adjustment in the aftermath of shocks. The a priori 
expectation for the expected coefficient for trade openness can, therefore, be either positive or 
negative. 
The level of economic development is proxied by real per capita GDP. Poor countries 
specialize in more volatile sectors and experience more frequent and severe aggregate shocks 
(Koren & Tenreyro, 2007). A negative coefficient for GDP per capita is therefore expected. 
Financial development may dampen output fluctuations by allowing for diversification as well 
as reducing information asymmetries in financial markets (Malik & Temple, 2009). Therefore, 
private credit is expected to have a negative coefficient. Finally, this study controls for the 
possible effect of political instability on output volatility by including the Political Rights Index 
from Freedom House. The sub-categories of the index permit for the electoral process, political 
pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. To obtain general political backing 
for policy decisions in democracies implies that risky policies are less frequent than under 
autocratic rule (Malik & Temple, 2009). Therefore, more democracy or political rights may be 
associated with less variable outcomes. Because the index ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating 
the highest political rights, a positive relationship between the index and output volatility is 
hypothesized. 
6.3.4 Estimation technique 
Panel regressions are estimated using macro-level data for 34 sub-Saharan African countries 
from 1990 to 2011. The specific countries appear in Appendix 6.B. Given the nature of the 
panel, large N and large T, this study tests for cross-section dependence as well as unit roots. 
Pesaran’s (2004) cross-section dependence test (CD) and Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS (Z(t-bar)) test 
for unit roots, which also caters for cross-section dependence, were employed. The CIPS tests 
were estimated with a constant term and trend while the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS) 
panel unit root test was first run on each series using an AIC automatic lag selection process to 
identify the number of lags to be used for the CIPS tests. Table 6.1 reports the tests for cross-
section dependence and unit roots. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
123 
 
Table 6.1: Tests for cross-section dependence and unit roots 
 
Note:  # indicates that the panel is unbalanced with not enough common observations across 
the panel to perform Pesaran’s (2004) test. 
 
Table 6.1 shows that eight out of ten variables exhibit cross-section dependence while five out 
of ten variables contain unit roots. Clearly there is a need to account for the cross-section 
dependence and non-stationarity in the panel. The recent non-stationary panel literature has 
focused on allowing general cross-section dependencies among panel members (Pedroni, 
Vogelsang, Wagner, & Westerlund, 2015). To account for this, models are estimated using the 
AMG estimator of Eberhardt and Teal (2010), a technique that caters for residual cross-section 
dependence as well as non-stationary residuals. Standard panel estimation techniques (e.g. 
pooled OLS, fixed- or random-effects, or GMM) do not necessarily produce consistent 
parameter estimates when the errors from a panel regression exhibit cross-section dependence 
(Kapetanios et al., 2011). 
 
 
 
Variable CD-test p-value Corr Abs(corr) CIPS p-value 
Output volatility 2.99 0.003 0.026 0.170 -5.450 0.000 
Financial openness 26.12 0.000 0.228 0.432 2.795 0.997 
FDI volatility 19.21 0.000 0.171 0.316 -3.201 0.001 
Log CPI 103.66 0.000 0.931 0.931 0.051 0.520 
Government expenditure 2.86 0.004 0.026 0.320 1.050 0.853 
TOT volatility 1.42 0.156 0.014 0.395 -4.855 0.000 
Trade openness 19.56 0.000 0.172 0.367 0.342 0.634 
GDP per capita 34.35 0.000 0.300 0.637 2.736 0.997 
Private credit 27.15 0.000 0.258 0.469 -2.145 0.016 
Political rights n/a# n/a# n/a# n/a# -2.388 0.008 
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6.4 Results and discussion 
Table 6.2: Financial openness and output volatility: The role of FDI volatility. Augmented 
Mean Group (AMG) estimator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively with 
t-statistics in parentheses.  
Root mean square error (RMSE) indicates the residual size of each model.  
The figures reported for CD and CIPS tests are p values.  
In model 2, financial openness interacts with FDI volatility. 
 
Table 6.2 presents the results. In model 1, FDI volatility is included as an explanatory variable. 
In model 2, to account for the possibility that FDI volatility may not have an independent 
impact on output volatility, an interaction term between financial openness and FDI volatility 
is specified. When FDI volatility and the interaction term is included in the same model, no 
clear insights of the determinants of output volatility is found given no significant factors. 
Subsequently, results from this model are not presented in Table 6.2. 
  Output volatility (1)  Output volatility (2) 
Financial openness  0.0021**(0.0010)  0.0021*(0.0011) 
FDI volatility  -0.0004(0.0012)  n/a 
Interaction term  n/a  -0.0001(0.0001) 
Log CPI  -0.2579(0.2108)  -0.2248(0.2157) 
Government expenditure  0.0095(0.0070)  0.0120*(0.0069) 
TOT volatility  -0.0029(0.0066)  -0.0031(0.0062) 
Trade openness  -0.0141*(0.0074)  -0.0146*(0.0078) 
GDP per capita  -0.0036*(0.0022)  -0.0038*(0.0022) 
Private credit  0.0231(0.0281)  0.0253(0.0302) 
Political rights  0.0043(0.0396)  -0.0093(0.0423) 
RMSE  0.2731  0.2714 
Observations 
Countries 
 669 
34 
 669 
34 
CD  0.218  0.175 
CIPS  0.000  0.000 
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In both models, financial openness is significantly positively related to output volatility. 
Financial openness could increase output volatility due to the movement of “hot money” 
(Meller, 2013). These flows are sensitive to interest rate differentials, future economic growth 
expectations, and expected security returns. Because of the sensitivity of these flows, a small 
shock to the economy can lead to volatile flows that exacerbate the shock and destabilize the 
local economy (Kim & Singal, 2000). Substantial reliance on external debt also exposes 
domestic economies to world interest rate shocks and, thus, higher output volatility (Kose et 
al., 2009).  
Maturity mismatch is widespread in developing economies. Converse (2014) demonstrated that 
maturity mismatch is an important channel through which uncertainty shocks impact the real 
economy. Because of financial frictions, firms are forced to rely on short-term debt that entails 
rollover risk for long-term investment. Rollover risk is increased with greater uncertainty 
regarding the future availability of borrowing, and long-term investment is cut back depressing 
aggregate demand and total factor productivity. As a consequence, capital flow volatility 
amplifies macroeconomic fluctuations in developing economies because firms cannot finance 
long-term projects without engaging in maturity mismatch (Converse, 2014). The findings are 
in line with Hwang et al. (2013) who report that financial openness increases output volatility 
in 81 developing countries. 
FDI volatility is not significant in explaining output volatility. In model 2, the interaction term 
between financial openness and FDI volatility is not significant as well. This suggests that the 
extent to which financial openness increases output volatility does not depend on the degree of 
FDI volatility. Hwang et al. (2013) report that while financial openness increases output 
volatility, it also does not depend on the degree of capital flow volatility. 
In both models, trade openness is significantly negatively related to output volatility. This can 
be explained that for sub-Saharan African countries, trade openness reduces the vulnerability 
to certain forms of financial crises and smooths the adjustment in the aftermath of shocks 
(Cavallo, 2008). GDP per capita is also significantly negatively related to output volatility in 
both models, as expected. The level of economic development is, therefore, an important factor 
in reducing output volatility in sub-Saharan Africa. Ahmed and Suardi (2009) also provide 
evidence that the degree of economic development is negatively related to output volatility in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In model 2, government expenditure is significantly positively related to 
output volatility. This result is in line with Meller’s (2013) finding that large government 
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spending could be a sign of macroeconomic imbalances or wastefulness that could destabilize 
an economy.  
The CD and CIPS tests of the residuals also show that the models are devoid of any cross-
section dependence and non-stationarity problems. 
6.4.1 Robustness 
The samples are split according to country income groups per World Bank classification. This 
process allows us to ascertain if the impact of financial openness on output volatility differs for 
middle-income countries (MICs) and low-income countries (LICs). The results appear in 
Appendices 6.C and 6.D. The CD test reveals that for the second LIC model, cross-section 
dependence is still prevalent in the residuals. However, the results do not differ from the first 
LIC model where the null hypothesis of cross-section independence in the residuals cannot be 
rejected. The CIPS tests of the residuals for LICs indicate no non-stationarity problems. The 
CD and CIPS tests of the residuals for MICs show that the models are devoid of any cross-
section dependence and non-stationarity problems. 
After the sample countries are split according to country income groups, financial openness 
remains significantly positively related to output volatility for MICs. For LICs, no significant 
relationship is found. At a more advanced stage of development, financial globalization could 
result in enhanced specialization making MICs more susceptible to industry-specific shocks 
and thereby increasing output volatility (Kose et al., 2009). Similar to the full country sample, 
after controlling for financial openness, no evidence is found regarding a link between FDI 
volatility and output volatility. The interaction term between financial openness and FDI 
volatility remains insignificant as well.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The chapter presented evidence regarding the link between financial openness and output 
volatility for sub-Saharan African countries from 1990-2011. This study specifically 
investigated how financial openness impacts on output volatility through the channel of volatile 
FDI flows: this has not been examined previously for the region. The study is further unique 
because of the use of a panel time-series estimator, the AMG estimator of Eberhardt and Teal 
(2010), which makes the findings robust to cross-section dependence. 
The main findings of the study are as follows: (1) Financial openness increases output 
volatility; (2) No evidence is found that FDI volatility is related to output volatility; (3) The 
extent to which financial openness increases output volatility does not depend on the degree of 
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FDI volatility; (4) For MICs, financial openness increases output volatility, while for LICs 
increased trade openness and a higher level of economic development reduces output volatility.  
The significant positive relationship between financial openness and output volatility 
highlights that financial openness remains a controversial issue. Although acknowledging that 
de jure financial openness indicators (as opposed to de facto financial openness indicators) are 
primarily concerned with the presence or not of legal restrictions on capital transactions, the 
results still pose questions relating to the IMF’s recent altered position regarding the use of 
capital controls. After years of opposing the use of capital controls, the IMF adopted a more 
accommodating stance towards capital controls in that it may well broaden the policy space 
available to developing countries to manage and deal with external shocks (Essers, 2013; 
Sarno, Tsiakas, & Ulloa, 2016). This study’s finding seems to support this view and further 
contributes towards this debate.  
Financial liberalization remains an incomplete and ongoing process in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Misati & Nyamongo, 2012; Ahmed, 2013) and some countries may need to open up their 
capital markets using a more gradual approach. Pre-conditions to financial liberalization 
include a stable macroeconomic environment, well-developed local institutions and markets, 
and appropriate regulatory policies (Beck, Fuchs, & Uy, 2009). To liberalize capital flows, 
IMF (2012) advocates an “integrated approach” that is consistent with a country’s institutional 
and financial development. This “integrated approach” proceeds through successive and often 
overlapping phases. FDI inflows should be liberalized first, followed by FDI outflows and 
long-term portfolio flows, and finally short-term portfolio flows. Each phase requires deeper 
and broader legal, accounting, financial, and corporate framework reforms (IMF, 2012).  
Regarding FDI inflows, this study’s finding of no link between FDI inflow volatility and output 
volatility is in line with that approach. 
Future research for sub-Saharan Africa should test the effect of capital flows composition on 
output volatility. Federico et al. (2013) stated that FDI volatility will reduce output volatility 
only if there is a positive correlation between FDI and other flows. 
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Appendix 6.A: Variables and data sources 
 
Output volatility: HP filter to detrend annual country growth rates the benchmark value of λHP 
= 100 to adjust for the sensitivity of the trend portion. After applying the HP filter, an annual 
cycle term is obtained for each country. Following Jetter (2014), this study squares the cycle 
term to obtain a measurement for the annual volatility component of a country’s growth rate. 
This value is subsequently divided by 100 to facilitate comparability. Country growth rates are 
obtained from World Bank WDI. 
Financial openness: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s (2007) “External Wealth of Nations Mark II” 
database (updated) was used to calculate the de facto financial openness indicator using the 
ratio of 
(𝐹𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝐹𝐿𝑖𝑡)
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
 with FA (FL) denoting the stock of external assets (liabilities). 
FDI inflows: net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. 
It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term 
capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment 
inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors and is divided by 
GDP. Series obtained from World Bank WDI. 
Volatility of FDI inflows: Standard deviation of FDI inflows using three-year overlapping 
rolling windows with the method described in  section 6.3.1. 
CPI: Consumer price index (log) (2010=100) reflects changes in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. The series is obtained from the World 
Bank WDI. 
Government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP): General government final 
consumption expenditure (formerly general government consumption) includes all government 
current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of 
employees). The series is obtained from the World Bank WDI. 
Terms of trade volatility: Standard deviation of net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100) 
using five-year overlapping rolling windows. The index is obtained from the World Bank WDI. 
Trade openness: Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP 
with the series obtained from the World Bank WDI. 
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GDP per capita: GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) with the series obtained from the World 
Bank WDI. 
Domestic credit: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP 
(%) with the series obtained from the World Bank Global Financial Development database. 
Political rights: The Political Rights index from Freedom House is used as political stability 
indicator. The sub-categories of the index permit for the electoral process, political pluralism 
and participation, and functioning of government. The index ranges from 1 to 7 with 1 
indicating the highest political rights. 
Appendix 6.B: Sample countries 
 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda. 
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Appendix 6.C: Financial openness and output volatility: The role of FDI 
volatility (MICs) 
 
Table 6.3: Financial openness and output volatility: The role of FDI volatility (MICs). 
Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
with t-statistics in parentheses.  
Root mean square error (RMSE) indicates the residual size of each model.  
The figures reported for CD and CIPS tests are p values.  
In model 2, financial openness interacts with FDI volatility. 
 
 
 
  Output volatility (1)  Output volatility (2) 
Financial openness  0.0022**(0.0010)  0.0019*(0.0010) 
FDI volatility  0.0019(0.0017)  n/a 
Interaction term  n/a  0.0001(0.0001) 
Log CPI  -0.2250(0.1650)  -0.1844(0.2061) 
Government expenditure  -0.0050(0.0108)  -0.0036(0.1087) 
TOT volatility  -0.0033(0.0026)  -0.0024(0.0029) 
Trade openness  -0.0002(0.0002)  -0.0002(0.0002) 
GDP per capita  -0.0002(0.0002)  -0.0002(0.0002) 
Private credit  0.0171(0.0158)  0.0185(0.0168) 
Political rights  0.0039(0.0392)  0.0020(0.0453) 
RMSE  0.1712  0.1690 
Observations 
Countries 
 294 
15 
 294 
15 
CD  0.449  0.328 
CIPS  0.000  0.000 
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Appendix 6.D: Financial openness and output volatility: The role of FDI volatility 
(LICs) 
 
Table 6.4: Financial openness and output volatility: The role of FDI volatility (LICs). 
Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  ***, ** and * indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
with t-statistics in parentheses.  
Root mean square error (RMSE) indicates the residual size of each model.  
The figures reported for CD and CIPS tests are p values.  
In model 2, financial openness interacts with FDI volatility. 
 
 
  Output volatility (1)  Output volatility (2) 
Financial openness  0.0018(0.0024)  0.0023(0.0030) 
FDI volatility  -0.0020(0.0026)  n/a 
Interaction term  n/a  -0.0001(0.0001) 
Log CPI  -0.3682(0.6283)  -0.3022(0.6252) 
Government expenditure  -0.0102(0.0157)  -0.0078(0.0160) 
TOT volatility  -0.0007(0.0132)  0.0018(0.0104) 
Trade openness  -0.0212*(0.0124)  -0.0215*(0.0121) 
GDP per capita  -0.0040**(0.0016)  -0.0043**(0.0017) 
Private credit  0.0215(0.0633)  0.0269(0.0670) 
Political rights  0.0580(0.0736)  0.0416(0.0802) 
RMSE  0.3173  0.3112 
Observations 
Countries 
 375 
19 
 375 
19 
CD  0.112  0.095 
CIPS  0.000  0.000 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This research has examined issues raised in the literature regarding private capital flow 
volatility and financial openness in sub-Saharan Africa. Firstly, the research sought to 
investigate the determinants of private capital flow volatility. It further examined whether 
remittance volatility impacted on financial sector development. Next it examined the link 
between cross-border banking volatility and economic growth. To conclude, the thesis 
investigated whether financial openness contributed to output volatility in the region. 
The first empirical chapter makes a unique contribution to the literature in a number of ways. 
Most empirical studies on capital flows focus on the determinants of capital flow levels, with 
few studies focusing on volatility determinants (Broto, Diaz-Cassou, & Erce, 2011). No study 
has focused exclusively on sub-Saharan Africa when investigating the determinants of private 
capital flow volatility. This study is further distinctive in that clearly-delineated cross-border 
bank lending data from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics were employed that has not been 
used by prior studies. The use of a panel time-series estimator, the AMG estimator of Eberhardt 
and Teal (2010), makes the findings robust to cross-section dependence and is another unique 
feature compared to the related literature. 
Although the impact of remittances on financial sector development has been examined 
previously, this study is the first to investigate whether remittance volatility influenced 
financial sector development. Most studies within the remittances-financial development nexus 
focused on one characteristic of financial development (financial depth), while this study 
extends this to include financial sector efficiency. This study further contributes to the literature 
by not only focusing on the financial development of banks but also investigating the impact 
of remittances and remittance volatility on stock markets. 
There are few empirical studies that have examined the link between cross-border banking 
volatility and economic growth. In addition, there is an absence of studies that have captured 
the influence of cross-border bank deposit flows on growth. This study makes a unique 
contribution to the literature by distinguishing separately between the effects of cross-border 
bank lending volatility and cross-border bank deposit volatility on economic growth. 
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No consensus exists in the theoretical and empirical literature on whether financial openness 
increases or reduces output volatility (Hwang, Park, & Shin, 2013; Meller, 2013). This study’s 
unique contribution to the literature is the examination of how financial openness impacts on 
output volatility through the channel of volatile FDI flows. Output volatility could exhibit 
cross-section dependence through regional and macroeconomic linkages, and the use of the 
AMG estimator of Eberhardt and Teal (2010) to account for cross-section dependence is 
another unique feature of this study.  
7.2 Summary of the findings 
The main findings concerning the determinants of private capital flow volatility are as follows: 
(1) global liquidity lowers FDI volatility, while for MICs global liquidity and global risk are 
significant drivers of FDI volatility; (2) global risk increases portfolio equity volatility, with 
the quality of macroeconomic policies and financial openness found to be important pull factors 
in lowering portfolio equity volatility; (3) financial openness and depth lowers cross-border 
bank lending volatility. For LICs, global liquidity lowers cross-border bank lending volatility, 
while the quality of macroeconomic policies is an important pull factor in lowering volatility. 
The empirical evidence from this thesis further reveals that remittance volatility is detrimental 
to both banking sector depth and efficiency. No evidence is found that remittance volatility is 
related to stock market development. 
Regarding cross-border volatility and economic growth, this study provides evidence that 
cross-border bank deposit volatility is detrimental to economic growth when the sample 
includes only RRDCs. The results further indicate that cross-border bank deposit flows 
contribute to economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa, but no evidence is found that cross-
border bank lending is related to economic growth. 
Concerning financial openness and output volatility, the findings are as follows: (1) financial 
openness increases output volatility; (2) no evidence is found that FDI volatility is related to 
output volatility; (3) the extent to which financial openness increases output volatility does not 
depend on the degree of FDI volatility; (4) for MICs, financial openness increases output 
volatility, while for LICs increased trade openness and a higher level of economic development 
reduces output volatility. 
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7.3 Conclusion 
The combined evidence reveals that sub-Saharan African countries should be concerned not 
only with private capital flow levels, but also the volatility of such flows. The significance of 
global push factors as determinants of private capital flow volatility is highlighted. While not 
disputing the relative stability of remittances relative to other private capital flow types, this 
study reveals that remittance volatility is not trivial and impacts on banking sector 
development. The results further indicate that cross-border bank loans and deposits require a 
differentiated analysis. Finally, this thesis indicates that financial openness remains a 
controversial policy option in sub-Saharan Africa and is a source of output volatility. 
7.4 Recommendations 
This thesis recommends some policy interventions necessary for sub-Saharan African countries 
to deal with volatile private capital flow occurrences and some of the consequences thereof.  
Because global push factors are significant factors that shape volatility and are beyond the 
control of sub-Saharan African economies, it is difficult to draw blanket policy 
recommendations. Forbes and Warnock (2012) suggest that countries apprehensive about 
capital flow volatility effects should seek to strengthen their capacity to endure these volatile 
capital episodes rather than reduce the volatility. Most sub-Saharan African frontier economies 
can improve the quality of their data in order to monitor capital flows effectively (IMF, 2014). 
To use macro-prudential policies effectively, supervisory resources that include adequately 
trained and qualified staff, the availability of high-frequency data and the tools necessary to 
assess systemic risks must all be improved (IMF, 2014). Sub-Saharan African countries should 
claim greater representation in international financial institutions. Greater representation will 
enable broader international policy coordination and ensure that the global financial 
architecture is more inclusive as well as more responsive to developing countries. 
Sub-Saharan African countries should have measures in place to monitor the predictability of 
remittances. A policy question regarding the cost of remittance transfer is necessary. Sub-
Saharan Africa remains the most expensive region to send money to (World Bank, 2015) and 
lowering transaction costs should result in more remittances being channelled through formal 
channels, making flows more predictable and less volatile. More competition among money 
transfer operators could possibly reduce the cost of remittance transfer (Beck, Fuchs, & Uy, 
2009). The formal financial sector should investigate which other financial demands 
remittance-recipients have beyond just offering savings accounts. 
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RRDCs should have measures in place to monitor the predictability of bank deposit flows. 
With the results further indicating that bank deposit flows are a driver of economic growth, 
policy makers should investigate ways to make banking less expensive for deposit customers. 
High minimum balance requirements and fees for cheque and savings account holders are 
prevalent in many African countries (Beck et al., 2009). The feasibility of investigating explicit 
deposit insurance within sub-Saharan Africa should be investigated, as only 24% of African 
countries have explicit deposit insurance (Demirgüç-Kunt, Lane, & Laeven, 2014). 
The results in this thesis support the view that some countries may need to open up their capital 
markets using a more gradual approach. This is in line with the IMF’s recently adopted view 
that “in certain circumstances, capital flow management measures can be useful” (IMF, 2012, 
p. 2). Fowowe (2013) argued that financial liberalization policies in sub-Saharan Africa did not 
achieve their objectives because of the absence of a stable macroeconomic environment in the 
1980s and 1990s. In addition, financial liberalization policies were implemented and treated as 
mere attachments of structural adjustment programmes. To reap the benefits of financial 
liberalization requires sound macroeconomic policies, well-developed local financial 
institutions and markets, and adequate financial regulation and supervision (Beck et al., 2009; 
IMF, 2012). Capital flows need to be liberalized in a sequential order, starting with FDI inflows 
as FDI inflows are more closely correlated with growth than other flows (IMF, 2012). This is 
in line with the results from this thesis that found no relationship between FDI inflow volatility 
and output volatility.  
Empirical analysis at a microeconomic level regarding the impact of remittances on recipient 
households’ use of bank services is still limited to a relatively small number of countries 
(Brown, Carmignani, & Fayad, 2013) and could provide scope for future research. Using a 
differentiated approach to investigate the determinants of cross-border bank lending and 
deposits to sub-Saharan African countries is a further future research avenue. Investigating the 
determinants of cross-border bank deposit volatility is also advocated. The effect of capital 
flow composition on output volatility is further envisioned as a future research avenue.  
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